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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
CEO MANAGERIAL ABILITY, CORPORATE INVESTMENT QUALITY, AND THE 
VALUE OF CASH 
 
 
By Huiqi Gan, Ph.D. 
 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of the Doctor of 
Philosophy in Business (Concentration in Accounting) at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
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Chair: Myung Seok Park, Ph.D. 
Robert L. Hintz Professor of Accounting 
 
 
This study investigates how CEO managerial ability affects investment quality, investment 
efficiency, and the value of cash. Specifically, I examine whether higher managerial ability is 
associated with higher M&A quality, more efficient capital investments, and higher value of cash. 
Investment decision-making and implementation can signal a CEO’s managerial ability (Stein 
2003), and shareholders assign more value to the cash of those firms with high ability CEOs. 
Thus, I predict that more able CEOs conduct higher quality M&A and make more efficient 
capital investment decisions. I also propose that the value of cash is higher for firms with more 
able CEOs. Using the methodology developed in Demerjian et al. (2012) to estimate CEO 
managerial ability, I find that the M&As conducted by more able CEOs are less likely to 
experience goodwill impairment and divestitures in the post-acquisition period. I also find that 
 
 
 
managerial ability, to a certain extent, can improve capital investment efficiency when firms 
have a higher likelihood of over- or under-investment. Furthermore, I provide evidence that cash 
has higher value if it is managed by more able CEOs. Overall, my findings suggest that while 
managerial ability plays a limited role in improving M&A quality, it significantly increases 
capital investment efficiency and the value of cash.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
  
Agency problems, such as moral hazards and adverse selection issues, are persistent 
when ownership and control rights are separated and can be exaggerated when the interests of 
the principal and the agent diverge (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf 1984; 
Jensen 1986). The agent can make corporate decisions at the expense of shareholders’ welfare in 
order to pursue his own interests. For example, Jensen (1986) contends that empire-building 
managers tend to make sub-optimal investment decisions when they have free cash flow, 
regardless of whether those investments would enhance firm value. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) 
and Morck et al. (1990) show that managers make manager-specific investments so that they are 
less easily replaceable and their jobs are more secure. Considering the crucial role that top 
managers play in managing corporations, and given this principal-agent context, it is important 
to study how the characteristics of top managers, especially the Chief Executive Officer (CEO, 
hereafter), affect corporate investment practices and outcomes.  
The upper echelons theory (e.g., Hambrick and Mason 1984) states that behavioral 
factors are influential in complex decisions in a corporate context. Generally speaking, strategic 
decisions and organizational outcomes are, to some degree, predicted by CEO managerial 
characteristics (Hambrick and Mason 1984). By separating unobserved manager-fixed effects 
from firm-fixed effects on the managers’ turnover sample, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that 
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a significant part of the heterogeneity in firms’ investment practices can be explained by the 
unobserved manager-fixed effects, which is consistent with Hambrick and Mason (1984).  
Although the board has the ultimate power to determine the policy on capital investments, 
it usually delegates the administration of investment practices to its agent, the CEO (Hill 1995). 
Therefore, CEOs bear the responsibility of initiating, evaluating, and overseeing the progress of 
investments (Lehn and Zhao 2006). This study thus investigates how CEO managerial ability 
affects investment decisions and corporate investment quality. This study also examines how the 
value of cash varies with CEO managerial ability. Stein (2003) argues that investment decision-
making and implementation signal a CEO’s managerial ability. The ability to select and 
implement high quality investments can be inferred by the capability and efficiency of running a 
firm. Considering that firms pay a higher compensation premium to attract and retain higher 
ability CEOs (Custodio et al. 2013), it is of great interest to study whether managerial ability 
brings the benefit of improving investment quality, investment efficiency, and the value of cash.  
Investment is one of the most important corporate activities, having the same objective as 
other corporate practices – to maximize firm value. Exhaustive capital budgeting procedures in 
firms are solid evidence of the importance of controlling investment practices (Holmstrom and 
Costa 1986). Inferior investment decisions harm shareholder wealth because they not only waste 
significant resources, but also result in negative impacts in the long run. In addition, inferior 
investments can lead to unexpected consequences. For example, Bens et al. (2012) show that 
investment-related pressure can cause misreporting. Specifically, they find that acquiring firms 
who experienced more negative stock returns around M&A announcements have a higher 
likelihood of distortion of their financial statements in the post-acquisition period.  
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In this research, I adopt the methodology developed in Demerjian et al. (2012) to estimate 
CEO managerial ability. Based on the assumption that more able CEOs generate higher revenue 
from a given level of resources, Demerjian et al. (2012) construct a direct measure of managerial 
ability to capture a CEO’s efficiency in managing the firm and producing revenue. This measure 
indicates a CEO’s managerial ability to produce more revenue while consuming fewer resources 
than his/her peers in the same industry. Such efficiency refers to the capability of value creation, 
value management, and value enhancement in corporate management, a capability that can 
ensure companies’ productivity and create shareholder value (Copeland et al. 1994). Therefore, I 
conjecture that a CEO’s managerial ability is positively associated with his/her firm’s investment 
quality and efficiency.  
I first examine the association between managerial ability and the quality of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A, hereafter). M&A are among the most important investment decisions and 
usually demand significant resources. Successful M&As can be a key factor of a firm’s strategic 
development plan, supports the superior growth of the firm, and eventually increases firm value 
(Copeland et al. 1994; Weston and Weaver 2001). However, evidence suggested by the literature 
on M&A (e.g., Healy et al. 1992; Agrawal and Jaffe 2000; Ghosh 2001; Moeller et al. 2004; Fee 
and Thomas 2004) reveals that the quality of M&A activities and their effects on subsequent 
firm performance vary widely. As ex ante evidence, capital market research on stock market 
reactions to M&A announcements shows that, although shareholders of the target-firms 
generally enjoy positive short-term returns, shareholders of acquiring firms frequently 
experience stock returns not significantly different from zero and even negative drifts in the 
months following acquisition (Agrawal and Jaffe 2000). This finding is further supported by a 
small positive stock return to acquiring firms and a negative average dollar change in the wealth 
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of the acquiring firms’ shareholders as documented in Moeller et al. (2004). In terms of ex post 
evidence, firms’ post-M&A performances are mixed. Jensen and Ruback (1983) report a 
negative drift in the stock price of acquiring firms several years after acquisition. The 
comprehensive review of post-M&A performance in Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) concludes that 
the long-run stock performance of acquiring firms is typically negative or, at best, not 
statistically different from zero. While Ghosh (2001) finds that operating performance does not 
improve after M&A, Healy et al. (1992) and Fee and Thomas (2004) provide evidence of 
improved performance after M&A.   
High ability CEOs make M&A decisions by taking firms’ strategic plans, available 
resources, industry characteristics, and the macroeconomic environment into consideration. In 
addition, with better knowledge of the underlying value of the existing business, including cost 
and revenue drivers, and better techniques of evaluating both existing and potential businesses, 
high ability CEOs are likely to make M&A that fit their firms’ strategy. In this sense, if an 
acquiring firm hires a high ability CEO, the firm is likely to experience less negative stock 
market performance or improved performance in the post-M&A periods. Thus, I predict that 
talented CEOs are more likely to make higher quality M&A decisions than less able CEOs. 
To proxy for M&A quality, I use the following four estimates of M&A quality suggested 
by prior studies (e.g., Francis and Martin 2010; Goodman et al. 2013): 1) Market reaction to 
M&A announcements is employed as an ex ante estimate of M&A quality, assuming the market 
provides unbiased valuation and insights about the quality of M&A and the probability of their 
success; 2) three other ex post estimates, including the post-acquisition change in operating 
performance (ROA and operating cash flow), the likelihood and the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment in the post-acquisition period, and the probability of divestiture. 
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I find that the M&A conducted by more able CEOs are less likely to experience goodwill 
impairment and divestiture in the post-acquisition period. I also find that managerial ability score 
is negatively associated with the post-acquisition change in operating cash flow. This result may 
be due to declining performance arising from a high frequency of M&A.
1
 I, however, do not find 
significant results when using the 3-day stock market reaction, the post-acquisition change in 
ROA, and the magnitude of goodwill impairment as proxies for M&A quality.   
Next, I investigate the association between CEO managerial ability and corporate capital 
investment efficiency. Specifically, I examine whether CEO managerial ability improves capital 
investment decisions when firms have the tendency to under-invest or over-invest by testing the 
conditional relation between capital investments and CEO managerial ability. Capital 
investments are undertaken to promote constant growth for companies by developing cutting-
edge knowledge, products, and technology that provide firms with competitive advantages. 
Nevertheless, prior literature documents that, due to agency problems and information 
asymmetry, it is not uncommon for firms to deviate from efficient capital investment levels, 
resulting in over-investment or under-investment (e.g., Jensen 1986; Richardson 2006; Biddle et 
al. 2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle et al. 2009). Particularly, Biddle et al. (2009) 
provide empirical evidence that reduced information asymmetry resulting from good quality of 
financial reporting can enhance investment efficiency.   
Higher ability CEOs are perceived to have better knowledge, skill sets, and judgment to 
anticipate future changes than their peers (Trueman 1986). CEOs who have the ability of 
efficiently managing a firm should make efficient capital investments because capital 
                                                          
1
 Untabulated results show that the average managerial ability score and ranking for a firm over the sample period 
from 1993 to 2011 is positively correlated with the frequency of M&As made by that firm. Conn, Cosh, Guest, and 
Hugues (2004) find that there are significant declines in short and long run performance for acquiring firms that 
conduct repeated M&As, which could be due to the difficulty of integrating subsequent acquisitions within the short 
time period between acquisitions. 
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investments are the inputs supporting revenue growth. Therefore, I predict that more able CEOs 
make more efficient capital investment decisions. In this study, I look at the efficiency of total 
capital investments and the main components of total capital investments: capital expenditures, 
research and development expenditures (R&D, hereafter), and acquisition expenditures. 
Specifically, I use the actual levels and the abnormal levels of these four measures as proxies for 
capital investments efficiency. 
Consistent with my predictions, I find that, when firms are most likely to under-invest, 
higher ability CEOs tend to increase the investment in R&D, acquisition expenditures, and total 
capital investments. On the other hand, when firms have a higher likelihood of over-investing, 
high ability CEOs tend to reduce the levels of the acquisition expenditures and total capital 
investments. However, this is not the case for capital expenditures. Specifically, I find that higher 
ability CEOs increase capital expenditures when firms are more likely to over-invest, indicating 
lower investment efficiency. Furthermore, the results show that talented CEOs increase the 
abnormal level of total capital investments, the abnormal level of R&D, and the abnormal level 
of acquisition expenditures when firms are most likely to under-invest, and decrease the 
abnormal level of total capital investments, the abnormal level of R&D, and the abnormal level 
of acquisition expenditures as firms’ likelihood of over-investing increases. Together, these 
results suggest that, to some extent, higher ability CEOs in general improve capital investment 
efficiency when firms have a tendency to under-invest or over-invest. 
Finally, I examine the effect of managerial ability on the value of cash. I conjecture that 
the value of cash is positively associated with managerial ability. Cash is an important source of 
internal capital that is under the control of CEOs. The decision on how to deploy cash is at the 
discretion of management (Liu and Mauer 2011). CEOs can choose to keep cash in the firm, 
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distribute it to shareholders, or make use of it to fund investments. Thus, the value of cash differs 
depending on the ways that CEOs use it, its availability, and the cost of external financing (e.g., 
Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; Fazzari et al. 1988; Pinkowitz and Williamson 2004). 
More able CEOs are likely to create greater value in cash by making better use of it, i.e., 
engaging in efficient and high quality investment activities. Therefore, I predict that, holding 
other things constant, the value of cash will be higher if it is managed by more able CEOs.  
Using the regression model developed in Faulkender and Wang (2006), I find that CEO 
managerial ability significantly increases the marginal value of cash. This finding is further 
substantiated by sub-sample analysis of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. The 
value of cash is typically lower if firms are financially unconstrained, because value-increasing 
investments can be funded through external capital and cash is not an urgent need (e.g., Myers 
and Majluf 1984; Fazzari et al. 1988; Faulkender and Wang 2006). The finding of my study 
shows that managerial ability can greatly increase the value of cash for firms that are not 
financially constrained, i.e., when firms have good credit ratings. 
This study makes two significant contributions. First, by providing evidence on how 
managerial ability influences investment decision-making using a comprehensive managerial 
ability measure, this study contributes to the literature on how individual-level factors affect 
corporate-level decisions and outcomes, which is consistent with the upper echelons theory in 
Hambrick and Mason (1984). With various proxies for managerial ability, prior research has 
shown that better CEOs are associated with better firm performance (e.g., Chang et al. 2010), 
more frequent management forecasts (Baik et al. 2011), and higher quality of accounting 
information (Francis et al. 2008; Demerjian et al. 2013). The results of this study add to this 
stream of literature by showing that CEO managerial ability has a certain impact on investment 
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quality and can improve capital investment efficiency. In addition, as M&A and capital 
investment decisions closely relate to firms’ strategic plans and future growth opportunities, the 
findings from this study shed light on the effect of higher ability CEOs on supporting the firm 
strategic development and growth.  
Second, the evidence of management talent positively impacting the value of cash has 
implications for better understanding about the role of CEO individual factors (i.e., managerial 
ability) in enhancing the value of internal capital. Cash is the lifeblood of a firm, especially in the 
post-financial crisis period. Prior research on the value of cash mainly focuses on firm-level 
factors, such as growth opportunities, investment options, and the external capital environment 
(e.g., Jensen 1986; Fazzari et al. 1988; Myers and Majluf 1984; Pinkowitz and Williamson 2004; 
Faulkender and Wang 2006; Richardson 2006). As the controller of cash in the firm, a CEO’s 
utilization of available cash directly impacts firm value. In this sense, this study provides a fresh 
perspective by showing that a firm’s cash displays higher value if it is managed by more able 
CEOs, thus being consistent with the view that shareholders consider the ability of a CEO when 
they evaluate cash.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections (Section II 
and Section III), I review the prior literature and generate hypotheses. I then discuss research 
design in Section IV and present the results in Section V. I discuss conclusions in Section VI. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Agency problems in the corporate investment context 
The neoclassical theory of corporate investment predicts that the optimal investment 
policy for a firm is to invest until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost, assuming 
management is seeking to maximize shareholders’ welfare (Tobin and Brainard 1977). In this 
sense, in order to maximize the benefit to shareholders, any project with positive net present 
value (NPV, hereafter) should be undertaken either through financing channels or using available 
cash, and all negative NPV projects should be rejected; any excess cash should be returned to the 
principal (Tobin and Brainard 1977; Jensen 1986; Biddle et al. 2009). Inconsistent with this ideal 
situation, prior literature identifies the possibility that decisions on investments, such as M&A, 
capital expenditures, and research and development expenditures (R&D, hereafter), may not be 
consistently made in the best interest of shareholders due to agency problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and control; rather, information asymmetry and possible conflicting 
interests between the principal and the agent can lead the agent to pursue his private benefit and 
sacrifice the principal’s best interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986).  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), even though appropriate incentives can be 
established to minimize the divergence of interests between the principal and the agent so that 
those interests can be aligned, disparities remain between the agent’s actual decisions and the 
decisions that would maximize the welfare of the principal given the optimal monitoring 
enforced by the principal. Such disparities can be driven by various personal incentives of 
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managers, especially when the conflicting interests between the principal and the agent are 
exaggerated. One incentive is known as empire-building. Jensen (1986) posits that if they have 
free cash, managers who are building an empire prefer to make acquisitions or over-invest rather 
than increase payouts to shareholders because returning cash to shareholders can reduce the 
resources under those managers’ control, resulting in a reduction of their power. These 
acquisitions or over-investments can have little benefit and even be value-destroying. Firms 
operated by such managers usually grow beyond their optimal size (Jensen 1986).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) theorize another management incentive that can lead to sub-
optimal investment. In order to make themselves more valuable to shareholders and more costly 
to replace, managers may direct their firms to invest in particular assets whose value is higher 
under their operations than under better managers, even when such investments are not value-
maximizing (Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Shleifer and Vishny (1989) refer to such phenomena as 
management entrenchment, and pursuit of such entrenchment often leads to an excessive 
expansion of existing lines of business and overpaying for targets in M&A cases, especially 
when the bidder firms are under-performing and their managers are under turnover threat 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989). In a similar vein, Morck et al. (1990) suggest that managers 
purposefully choose certain investments and overpay for them if there are private benefits to 
managers such as enhancing long term promotion, varying human capital risk, and augmenting 
job security, even when those kinds of investments can sacrifice the market value of firms. As 
the empirical evidence of bidding managers' private incentive driving low value M&A, Morck et 
al. (1990) show that  their stocks perform poorly when bidders invest in unrelated business, 
acquire rapidly growing targets, and have bad firm performance before M&A. 
 11 
 
 Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that the entrenchment issue also exists in founder-CEO firms. 
Conjecturing that the investment behavior of founder-CEO firms can exhibit different patterns 
from that of successor-CEO firms because founder-CEOs have innate motivation, higher equity 
stake, greater influence, and more decision execution power over their firms, Fahlenbrach (2009) 
finds that founder-CEOs invest in more R&D, carry out higher capital expenditures, and conduct 
more focused M&A; however, most of those investments are not necessarily value-enhancing 
and can imply over-investment problems (Fahlenbrach 2009).  
Career concern is another private incentive of managers identified by prior literature that 
can cause potential incongruity in the interests of managers and shareholders. Since management 
ability is signaled mainly through firm performance and managers have private information 
about the profitability and benefit in terms of investments, they will try to impact outside party’s 
learning and evaluation process about their ability by their choice of project selections 
(Narayanan 1985; Holmstrom and Costa 1986). Due to career concerns, managers are motivated 
to build up and maintain their reputation (Hirshleifer 1993). To do this, managers can 
purposefully choose projects that produce short-term profits so that their ability can be evaluated 
and their compensation will be raised, ignoring the long-term interests of their firms (Narayanan 
1985; Holmstrom and Costa 1986; Hirshleifer 1993). As well, in order to maintain their 
established reputation, managers can engage in myopic investment behavior. For instance, 
Kanodia et al. (1989) argue that, because of information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders, managers want their ability, reputation, and other human capital to be informed by 
shareholders through managers’ actions. Such reputation effects can distort preferences over 
actions. As a result, managers are likely to continue supporting poorly performing projects to 
avoid detrimental reputation consequences from project abandonment (Kanodia et al. 1989). 
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Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) demonstrate managers’ reputation incentive in making investment 
decisions from another perspective. Since a manager’s ability to pinpoint favorable investment 
opportunities is vital to the firm but is typically only known to the manager, making observable 
success or failure of investments is the major channel through which this manager’s ability can 
be inferred; consequently, managers can bypass high value and high risk investment 
opportunities and accept relatively safe and low value projects so that early failure of the 
investment is less likely occur (Hirshleifer and Thakor 1992).  
Lastly, both Bliss and Rosen (2001) and Harford and Li (2007) propose another possible 
motivation that can drive managers to make M&A decisions that deviate from maximizing 
shareholder value: managers’ compensation following M&A. Bliss and Rosen (2001) show that 
CEO wealth typically improves following a large bank merger even if the stock of the bidder 
performs poorly. In a similar vein, Harford and Li (2007) find that even in mergers in which 
bidding shareholders’ wealth is impaired, bidding CEOs are still better off three quarters 
following the mergers. While CEOs’ overall wealth is sensitive to positive stock performance, it 
is insensitive to negative stock performance after M&A because any negative effect is offset by 
large grants of new stock and options subsequent to M&A activities as rewards for growth 
(Harford and Li 2007).
2
  
The under-performance phenomena after M&A evident from empirical studies indicates 
the failure of firm value maximization in investment activities due to the agency problems 
discussed above. For instance, by examining the literature on long-run abnormal returns 
following M&A, Agrawal and Jaffer (2000) conclude that M&A activities appear to provide, at 
most, mixed benefits to the involved stakeholders. Specifically, although shareholders of 
                                                          
2
 Harford and Li (2007)’s empirical evidence shows that the insensitivity of CEO wealth to poor M&A decisions can 
be corrected by stronger corporate governance to some degree; bidding firms with stronger boards tend to make their 
CEO compensation sensitive to poor performance subsequent to the merger. 
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acquired-firms generally enjoy positive short-term returns, shareholders in acquiring firms often 
experience under-performance in terms of their share price after M&A (Agrawal and Jaffe 2000). 
According to Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), in the relationship analyses of short-term stock return 
and long-term stock return for M&A cases, if the proposition that markets react slowly to merger 
news is correct, then this relation should be positive. That is, a high (low) return around a M&A 
announcement should be accompanied with a high (low) return following its completion. If the 
proposition that the market overreacts to the merger event is correct, the relation should be 
negative. There should be no relation if the post-M&A under-performance is due to factors 
unrelated to the M&A. The results support the prediction that the stock markets overreact to 
M&A announcements. In addition, based on the context that capital investment inefficiency can 
result from information asymmetry due to the separation of control rights and ownership, Biddle 
and Hilary (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009) show evidence that higher financial reporting quality 
can alleviate the capital investment inefficiency problem by reducing information asymmetry, 
thus mitigating the moral hazard and adverse selection problems between firms and outside 
capital providers. Particularly, Biddle et al. (2009) find that higher financial reporting quality can 
improve the capital investment efficiency of firms that operate in highly likely over-investment 
or highly likely under-investment environments, making their capital investments closer to 
expected levels. 
In sum, prior research contends that agency problems arising from the separation between 
ownership and control rights and potential conflicting interests between shareholders and 
managers lead managers to pursue their own incentives to the detriment of shareholders. This 
can result in sub-optimal decision making in the investment context, such as the practice of over-
investment and under-investment, investing in negative NPV projects, overpaying for 
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acquisitions, conducting value-destroying M&A activities, and delaying the abandonment of 
losing projects. 
2.2 CEO personal characteristics and corporate investment practice  
Although big investment decisions, such as M&A, R&D, and capital expenditure, are 
finally approved by a firm’s board of directors, they are usually initiated, evaluated, and 
implemented by the CEO. In other words, CEOs are mainly responsible for investment activities 
and the large variation in the valuation effects related to investment decisions (Lehn and Zhao 
2006). As discussed above, the agency problems arising from the separation between ownership 
and control rights can preclude the CEO from acting in the best interest of shareholders when the 
CEO pursues his own personal benefits. Therefore, it is important and interesting to study how 
CEOs and their personalities affect corporate investment practices.  
According to the upper echelons theory proposed in Hambrick and Mason (1984), 
complex decisions are largely the results of behavioral factors, and decisions usually reflect the 
idiosyncrasies of decision-makers to some degree. When making a decision, the decision-maker 
usually brings in a cognitive base and their own values. The cognitive base is reflected through 
anticipation of future events, insight about alternatives, and estimates about consequences related 
to those alternatives (March and Simon 1958; Hambrick and Mason 1984). When elaborating on 
the relation between upper echelons characteristics and firms’ strategic choices, Hambrick and 
Mason explain that both psychological aspects, such as cognitive base values, and observable 
background characteristics (i.e., age, education, and financial position), can affect the decision-
maker’s strategic choices on product innovation, potential acquisition opportunities, capital 
intensity, and forward integration (Hambrick and Mason 1984). In sum, the theory in Hambrick 
and Mason (1984) maintains that organizational outcomes, including strategic decisions and 
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corporate performance, are partially predicated and determined by CEO managerial 
characteristics.   
In studying managerial effects, some of the studies utilize management turnover events to 
identify how top managers influence corporate investment practices. For example, to capture the 
unobserved manager-fixed effects, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) separate the manager-fixed 
effects from the firm-fixed effects using turnover samples, and find that a significant extent of 
the heterogeneity in corporate investment activities can be explained by the unobserved 
manager-fixed effects. In order to investigate CEOs’ significant influence on the levels and 
quality of general investments, Hornstein (2013) uses empirical data to track investment patterns 
before, during, and after CEO turnover. The results of Hornstein (2013) show that firms exhibit a 
pattern of over-investing prior to CEO turnover; though investments pause around the turnover 
period, the level of expenditures typically rises after the turnover. Further, forced CEO turnovers 
are more likely to occur in more severe over-investment circumstances, and investment decisions 
are generally more efficient following those forced turnovers (Hornstein 2013). According to 
Hornstein, the findings uncovered in those CEO turnover analyses complement prior research 
about the CEO influence on the efficiency of corporate investments and capital budgeting 
decisions due to idiosyncratic factors and incentives of the individual. 
Instead of using turnover events to capture manager effects, Barker and Mueller (2002) 
study certain observed CEO characteristics and how they relate to firms’ R&D level. For the 
majority of firms, R&D is one of the important investment decisions made by CEOs. Such 
investments are considered to be the impetus in developing new products, refining, improving, 
and innovating processes and technologies, and driving the growth opportunities and future 
development of firms. The work of Barker and Mueller (2002) provides evidence on how CEO 
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characteristics play a role in the pattern of R&D investments after taking firm strategy, 
ownership structure, and other firm characteristics into account. More specifically, with a sample 
of publicly traded firms, Barker and Mueller (2002) show that CEO characteristics explain 
significant variance in firm R&D practices – the level of R&D is negatively related to CEO age, 
and positively related to CEO shareholding in the company, career experience especially in 
marketing and engineering, advanced science-related degrees, and tenure. Using CEO tenure, the 
number of times a CEO’s name is mentioned in business articles, and industry-adjusted firm 
performance as proxies for CEO reputation, Jian and Lee (2011) show that stock markets react 
more positively to the announcements of capital investments made by CEOs with a higher 
reputation, supporting the assertion that more reputable CEOs pursue more valuable projects 
which are more likely to support firms’ future development and cash flow generation, and the 
stock market recognizes this favorable prospect.  
There is a stream of literature investigating how the hubris and overconfidence attributes 
of CEOs prompt them to engage in M&A. Roll (1986) first proposes that M&A can be purely 
due to managers’ hubris. According to Roll (1986), the hubris characteristic of managers may 
drive them to over-estimate the value of M&A when they are using private information to assess 
the economic consequence of synergies and future performance. If it is the case, a price decline 
when announcing a bid, a price increase when forgoing or losing a bid, and a price decline when 
finally winning a bid are all predicted (Roll 1986). After collecting and analyzing previous 
empirical studies on M&A, Roll (1986) believes that the hubris hypothesis is supported and 
explains the phenomena of overall small gains, absolute dollar values are not significantly 
different from zero, and abnormal returns are negative in certain M&A circumstances.  
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Inspired by the hubris hypothesis, later works investigate a closely related attribute to 
hubris, overconfidence, and its impact on corporate investment practices such as M&A, capital 
expenditures, and R&D. For example, as stated by Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Malmendier 
and Tate (2008), overconfident CEOs believe in their exceptional decision-making and execution 
abilities. With that cognitive bias, overconfident CEOs can become obsessive and engage in 
highly perplexing business activities such as diversifying and value-destroying acquisitions and 
overpaying for target companies. Particularly, using high order acquisition deals (the number of 
M&A they conducted within a short time range) and increasing ownership stake of insiders as 
two measures for overconfidence, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) provide evidence showing that 
overconfident bidders generally realize lower announcement returns and long-run performance 
than rational bidders. In a similar vein, using the scenario of CEO over-investment  and CEO 
press portrayal as two proxies for overconfidence, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that the 
likelihood of making an acquisition is 65% higher for a overonficent CEO, and that the stock 
reaction to M&A announcements is significantly less favorable if the M&A are conducted by 
overconfident CEOs. In addition, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that when internal resources 
are sufficient, overconfident CEOs are more likely to initiate and pursue diversifying rather than 
non-diversifying M&A. Extending the U.S. evidence to international cases, Ferris et al. (2013) 
study a sample of CEOs of Fortune Global 500 firms from 2000 to 2006 and find that CEO 
overconfidence has incremental power in explaining the number of M&A offers, the density of 
making non-diversifying and diversifying acquisitions, and the use of cash payments in M&A 
activities.  
Turning to the empirical evidence of irrational capital investment made by overconfident 
CEOs, Malmendier and Tate (2005) maintain that CEO overconfidence can cause distorting 
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investment practices in a corporate context. The results in Malmendier and Tate (2005) reveal 
that overconfident CEOs tend to over-invest when they have excess internal funds, because they 
overestimate the payback of the investment they choose, while they trim down investment when 
they have to resort to outside financing, in which case their company can be undervalued. In 
investigating whether overconfident CEOs achieve greater innovative success, Hirshleifer et al. 
(2012) show evidence that overconfident CEOs invest more in innovation and possess more 
patents and patent citations when R&D is controlled, but such results are only valid in innovative 
industries, indicating that overconfident CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities 
(Hirshleifer et al. 2012). 
In addition to the above empirical research, behavioral research methodology is also 
employed to study CEO personalities in a corporate investment context. For example, via 
measuring CEO personal characteristics through content analysis of speeches, questionnaires, 
and length of CEO biographies, Rovenpor (1993) proposes and provides weak to moderate 
evidence that higher levels of CEO beliefs that “bigger is better,” beliefs in synergy,”  and need 
for power and self-confidence are significantly related to more frequent M&A activities. Using a 
survey instrument to study the role of individual heterogeneity in corporate investment and 
financing decision-making, Graham et al. (2013) show that CEOs who are more risk-tolerant are 
more likely to pursue M&As.  
2.3 Managerial ability 
The signal and impact of managerial ability have always been of great interest to 
academic researchers considering the central role of top management, especially CEOs and 
CFOs, in decision-making and corporate practice. By emphasizing the role of managerial 
characteristics in business practice, Lazear (1986) claims that a firm can expect the best outcome 
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only when a manager’s ability and skill level match his firm’s needs (Lazear 1986). Based on 
this theory, researchers in the accounting, finance, and management fields explore how managers 
signal their ability to the public and whether the individual variations in managerial talent have 
an incremental explanatory power to explain the variable levels of corporate decision quality, 
diverse firm practices, and economic outcomes. 
 One stream of accounting and finance literature uses market mechanisms to indicate 
managerial ability. Assuming the stock market is efficient, market reaction should incorporate 
investors’ belief and expectation about a firm’s CEO ability. Hayes and Schaefer (1999) show 
that firms losing CEOs to other firms experience more negative abnormal returns. In contrast, 
firms hiring CEOs away from other firms have significantly positive abnormal returns. In a 
similar vein, Chang et al. (2010) use firms’ pre-departure performance and CEO pay to indicate 
CEOs’ abilities. They show that the stock market reaction to CEO turnover is negatively 
associated with the firm’s previous performance and the CEO’s pay, and that better prior firm 
performance and higher CEO pay lead to a better subsequent labor market for the CEO. 
According to Chang et al. (2010), these results are consistent with the prediction that differences 
in firm performance do not entirely stem from firm specific effects but can be partly due to CEO 
factors. Milbourn (2003) claims that the stock price naturally indicates the probability of a 
current CEO being replaced in the future; stock prices can reflect the fact that one CEO with 
higher ability has a greater likelihood of being retained, thereby offering a more informative 
contracting mechanism, and vice versa. In addition, relying on the proposition that CEO ability 
can improve the credibility of management forecasts, Baik et al. (2011) show that the market 
reacts more to the news in management forecasts released by high ability CEOs than to those 
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released by relatively low ability CEOs. In sum, the stock market operates as if it reacts to 
indications managerial ability. 
Another stream of study adopts indirect measures to proxy for managerial ability and 
capture the variation in levels of managerial ability. Management forecast quality has been used 
as a proxy for managerial ability. According to Trueman (1986), management earnings forecasts 
release a public signal of a manager’s ability to expect future changes regarding the firm’s 
business environment and microeconomic situation and adapt the firm’s operations strategy 
appropriately. Farrell and Whidbee (2003) use forecast errors (implied ability of expectation 
management) to indicate CEOs’ abilities because forecast errors can capture information about 
unexpected performance that the board attributes, to a large degree, to the CEOs’ abilities. 
Similarly, Lee et al. (2012) find that the likelihood of CEO turnover is positively associated with 
the magnitude of forecast errors when firm performance is poor. Meanwhile, Goodman et al. 
(2013) show that a higher quality of management forecasts can improve their corporate 
investment decisions.  
Other studies use CEO reputation as a proxy for managerial ability (e.g., Milhoum 2003; 
Rajgopal et al. 2006; Francis et al. 2008; and Baik et al. 2011), where CEO reputation is 
typically measured by the number of articles in the public press containing a CEO's name. 
Among these studies, Milhoum (2003) develops a model and empirically tests the prediction that 
CEO reputation is positively related to stock-based pay sensitivities. Francis et al. (2008) find a 
negative association between highly-reputed CEOs and lower discretionary accruals, indicating 
that CEO reputation has a positive impact on earnings quality. Using reputation as one of the 
managerial ability measures, Baik et al. (2011) find that the frequency of issuing management 
earnings forecast increases with CEO ability, implying that higher ability CEOs transmit more 
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information to the market than do low ability CEOs. As well, prior firm level performance has 
been used to proxy for managerial ability. According to Harris and Holmstrom’s (1982) dynamic 
model of efficient wage contracts, managers work on the firm's behalf and generates observable 
output, through which firms can learn about a manger’s ability over time. This theoretical 
argument has also been supported by empirical evidence of a positive association between 
managerial characteristics and firm performance (e.g., Rajgopal et al. 2006; Carter et al. 2010; 
Chang et al. 2010; Baik et al. 2011; Banker et al. 2013). 
Though the above proxies can capture managerial ability to some degree, there is still a 
question if they are appropriate to comprehensively measure the CEO’s managerial ability. If a 
measure of managerial ability is not exhaustive in its manner and managerial-specific effects are 
not fully considered and evaluated separately from firm-specific effects, any analyses using such 
proxies can be biased. Responding to this concern, Demerjian et al. (2012) propose and develop 
a method to capture managerial ability in a more comprehensive way by partitioning total 
efficiency into the firm level and manager individual-level efficiency. The managerial ability 
measure in Demerjian et al. (2012) reflects managers’ efficiency compared to their industry peers 
in transforming corporate resources to revenues. Specifically, assuming that more able managers 
produce more revenue given a certain level of resources (or consume less resources to generate a 
certain level of revenue), Demerjian et al. (2012) maximize the revenue and minimize the 
revenue-generating resources, including cost of inventory, general and administrative expenses, 
fixed assets, operating leases, prior R&D, and intangible assets, to infer firms’ overall efficiency 
in generating revenues. They then separate firm-level efficiency from managerial-level 
efficiency, resulting in CEO managerial ability. Demerjian et al. (2012) confirm the validity of 
this measure of managerial ability by showing a strong association between their measure and 
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manager fixed effects and a positive (negative) stock market reaction to CEO turnover when the 
outgoing CEO is considered to have low (high) ability as evaluated by this measure.  Demerjian 
et al. (2012) also find that replacing CEOs with more (less) able CEOs enhance (diminish) 
subsequent firm performance. In another study, Demerjian et al. (2013) shows that earnings 
quality positively relates to managerial ability using the measure introduced by Demerjian et al. 
(2012). Baik et al. (2011), using the same measure of managerial ability, find their results are 
consistent across three measures of managerial ability.  
2.4 The value of cash 
In a frictionless context, companies can fund all investment opportunities, if those 
investments are believed to be value-increasing, using outside capital resources. In that case, 
investment decisions do not depend on the availability of internal capital (Modigliani and Miller 
1958). However, in reality, market imperfections and agency problems make internal capital and 
external capital imperfect substitutes. If outside capital is too costly, firms will resort to their 
internal capital to fund their investments. As a result, firms value their cash differently and 
investment decisions may depend on the availability of internal financing (e.g., Fazzari et al. 
1988). In this sense, free cash is an important factor affecting managers’ investment decisions. 
According to Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004), higher value of cash is placed by shareholders 
whose firms have better and more volatile growth opportunities than those who have fewer and 
more stable growth opportunities. 
The value of cash in a firm is affected by several factors. Generally speaking, if firms 
have high external capital costs, then cash, as one internal capital source, is valued more. This 
relation can be even stronger if firms face favorable investment opportunities. According to 
Myers and Majluf (1984), asymmetric information between investors and managers can make 
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external financing costly, in which case firms who identify valuable investment opportunities 
have to rely on internal capital resources. Facing costly external financing and lacking sufficient 
internal capital at the same time would result in bypassing positive NPV investment 
opportunities, resulting in under-investment. Thus, a dollar of cash held by a firm may be valued 
at more than a dollar by its shareholders (Myers and Majluf 1984). Empirical studies have shown 
that the value of cash is especially high in financially constrained firms. For instance, Fazzari et 
al. (1988) propose that when firms experience financing constraints, their investment decisions 
are not only subject to the evaluation of the prospects of the project, but they are also limited to 
the availability of internal funds. The findings from Faulkender and Wang (2006) also support 
the view that when firms experience low levels of internal funding and resort to external markets 
to raise cash to seize value-enhancing investment opportunities, their cash has a marginal value 
higher than $1, depending on the transaction costs occurring in the capital markets (Faulkender 
and Wang 2006). In a similar vein, Denis and Sibilkov (2010) demonstrate that cash is expensive 
for financially constrained firms so that positive NPV investment are not bypassed, suggesting 
the marginal value of an investment is greater for constrained firms.  
On the other hand, firms with free cash can have a low value because of the agency costs 
arising from the separation between ownership and control rights (Jensen 1986). According to 
Jensen (1986), managers are likely to pursue their own interest, i.e., engaging in excessive 
investments to build their empires, if there is a large volume of free cash under their control, 
decreasing the value of cash to shareholders. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed by 
Hardford (1999), who concludes that firms with high levels of cash are more likely to engage in 
value-decreasing acquisitions than their counterparts, by showing evidence that cash-rich bidders 
lose seven cents in value for each additional dollar of cash holding. Opler et al. (1999) also find 
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that companies with excess cash display higher capital expenditure levels and tend to spend more 
on acquisitions, even when they do not have good investment opportunities. In another work, 
Richardson (2006) finds consistent evidence that firms who over-commit investments are firms 
with the highest levels of free cash flow and that the presence of active shareholders can mitigate 
such over-investment. Inspired by the monitoring function of corporate governance in preventing 
management from committing free cash to low value investments, Harford et al. (2008) and 
Dittmar and Smith (2007) study the effects of corporate governance on the use and the value of 
firm cash. Specifically, Harford et al. (2008) find that, for a group of firms with high level of 
cash, those with weaker governance spend cash more quickly on M&As and capital expenditures 
than those with stronger governance, and such over-spending often reduces firm value. Similarly, 
Dittmar and Smith (2007) show that the value of cash is positively associated with corporate 
governance and that good governance can double the value of cash compared to a poor 
governance situation.  
Keeping a large volume of free cash in a firm can be a risk because management would 
engage in excessive value-decreasing investments leading to low value of cash as discussed 
above. Faulkender and Wang (2006) also argue that the marginal value of cash can also decline 
if firms with free cash flow distribute the funds to shareholders or use the funds to settle debt 
rather than invest in value-increasing projects.
3
 Therefore, it is critical for shareholders to 
balance the over-investment and under-investment tradeoff in order to maximize the value of 
cash by providing sufficient internal capital for management to fund positive NPV projects, 
while not freely providing capital to allow management to over-invest (Harford et al. 2008). 
                                                          
3
 According to Faulkender and Wang (2006), dividends to shareholders decrease the value of free cash and using 
cash to settle liabilities increase debt value but not equity value; therefore, the stock market does not assign a high 
value on one dollar change in cash in these cases.  
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CHAPTER 3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Investment decision making and implementation signal a CEO’s managerial ability for 
two reasons. First, less able CEOs can under-invest or over-invest because of their careers and 
reputation concerns. They may be eager to inform investors about their ability through 
investments that are observable to investors, thereby resulting in over-investment and even 
value-decreasing investments (Stein 2003). Second, less able CEOs may ignore their own private 
information about payoffs and copy the decisions of previous managers because they are afraid 
that their investment decisions may result in punishment from shareholders and markets 
(Scharfstein and Stein 1990). In contrast, putting their reputation at stake, more able CEOs are 
likely to consider more seriously about each investment decision they are going to make. 
Therefore, CEO managerial ability is likely tied to the quality and efficiency of investment 
decisions in corporate investment context.  
Demejian et al. (2012) suggest that a CEO’s ability to operate a firm can be reflected by 
his/her efficiency of revenue generation by consuming fewer resources than his/her peers in the 
same industry. Such efficiency indicates a manager’s ability to create, manage, and enhance the 
value of the firm, increasing the firm’s productivity. A firm’s productivity is a critical aspect to 
maximize shareholder value because shareholder value becomes greater as more output is 
produced with fewer inputs (Copeland et al. 1994). Investments, including M&A and other types 
of capital investments, are important corporate activities that support a firm’s productivity and 
continuous growth. Investment activities share the same objective as other corporate activities: to 
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maximize firm value. According to Copeland et al. (1994), a qualified CEO usually possesses a 
value-oriented view of investment activities that match the business strategy well and responds 
to investment opportunities that can create incremental value to the firm, either through potential 
internal and/or external growth. As such, I conjecture that CEOs with higher ability, indicated by 
their efficiency of operating a firm, make higher quality and more efficient investment decisions.  
 M&A are the investment opportunities to support external growth and eventually to 
realize internal growth. Successful M&A activities are typically rooted in a strong and efficient 
firm, and they are able to advance the strategic vision and support operating efficiency (Weston 
and Weaver 2001). In this process, a development of a strategic vision and accurate and 
sufficient valuation work are crucial. I expect both of the strategic vision development and the 
valuation work is dependent on CEOs’ managerial ability and efficiency for the following 
reasons. First, high quality CEOs are good at anticipating future changes in their firms’ 
underlying economy (Trueman 1986). They generate strategic plans for firms by assessing the 
dynamic characteristics of the industry, surrounding competitive environment, and the 
sufficiency of financial, technological, and managerial support to attain and maintain a 
competitive dominance (Copeland et al. 1994; Weston and Weaver 2001). Second, CEOs play a 
key role in estimating the accurate value of existing businesses and potential targets because of 
their private information, their unique knowledge about business operations, and the ability to 
foresee future prospects. The evaluation of existing businesses, including interpreting core 
business and industry structure, capitalizing on economies of scale, and exploiting technology or 
skills transfers, and the estimation of present values of potential investments are essential to the 
success of M&A (Copeland et al. 1994). Such evaluation and estimation techniques require a 
CEO’s knowledge of his/her firm’s cost structure and revenue drivers (Goodman et al. 2013). If 
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a CEO manages his/her firm efficiently, it is very likely that he/she understands and analyzes the 
cost and revenue drivers of the firm very well, enabling him/her to arrive at an accurate estimate 
of the value of the M&A. Such skill and knowledge also help a high ability CEO identify the 
right type of synergies, i.e. revenue improvement synergies and/or cost saving synergies, which 
best supports the whole firm’s operation efficiencies.  
Based on these discussions, I predict that the M&A conducted by more able CEOs have 
more favorable outcomes than those conducted by less able CEOs. Specifically, I expect that 
stock market will react more favorably to the M&A announcements for firms with higher ability 
CEOs, and that M&As initiated by higher ability CEOs have better post-acquisition performance 
in terms of changes in operating performance and the likelihood of goodwill impairment and 
divestiture. Therefore, I posit the following hypotheses in the alternate forms: 
H1: More able CEOs are more likely to make higher quality M&A decisions 
than less able CEOs. 
H1a: Stock market reaction to M&A announcements for firms with more able 
CEOs is more positive than that for firms with less able CEOs. 
H1b: M&A conducted by more able CEOs have better post-acquisition 
performance compared to those conducted by less able CEOs. 
 
Capital investment is necessary to promote internal growth for firms. Typical capital 
investments, such as capital expenditures and R&D are expected to support the growth of 
cutting-edge knowledge, products, and technology so that firms can maintain their competitive 
advantage. Capital investments are central to the value creation and value maximization of firms 
(Copeland et al. 1994). Capital expenditures and R&D are mainly related to existing operations. 
Hence, a CEO’s ability to make investment decisions may be significantly influenced by his/her 
efficiency of operating the firm and the knowledge of the key drivers for future growth. In 
addition, similar to M&A, investment decisions on capital expenditures and R&D require a 
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vision of future changes and accurate valuation work. The higher ability to foresee and estimate 
the future payoffs from the new assets and research inputs, the more efficient investment 
decisions would be made (Goodman et al. 2013). Furthermore, choosing the correct hurdle rate is 
also important because either a too high or too low hurdle rate can prevent a company from 
adopting efficient investment policies. Copeland et al. (1994) believe that CEOs who have high 
productivity determine an appropriate hurdle rate by focusing on the information from the 
specific business segment levels instead of a company-wide rate. Therefore, I develop the 
following hypothesis in the alternate form: 
H2: More able CEOs make more efficient decisions on capital investments than 
less able CEOs. 
 
A dollar of cash held by a firm can be valued at more than a dollar by its shareholder, 
depending on both firm-level and individual-level factors. For example, the cash in financially 
constrained firms tends to be valued more because its availability greatly impacts whether firms 
can pursue favorable investment opportunities (e.g., Myers and Majluf 1984; Fazzari et al. 1988; 
Faulkender and Wang 2006; Denis and Sibilkov 2010). Corporate governance is also shown to 
have an influence on the value of cash. According to Dittmar and Smith (2007) and Harford et al. 
(2008), a strong corporate governance mechanism can effectively enhance the value of cash. 
Aside from firm-level factors discussed above, the value of cash can be affected by individual-
level factors. Cash is the internal capital under the CEOs’ control. CEOs have discretion to 
determine the use of cash (Liu and Mauer 2011). Jensen (1986) believes that with available cash 
in control, CEO individual factors, such as CEOs’ personal interests and incentives, affect how 
the cash will be utilized. Sometimes the cash may not be used to maximize firm value (Jensen 
1986).  
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I argue that the value of cash can vary across different levels of CEO managerial ability. 
In other words, shareholders can attach higher value to cash if they believe the CEO has higher 
ability to manage the cash well. More able CEOs are likely to use the available cash in better 
ways and create greater value from its use, i.e., by making better capital investment decisions. 
Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis in an alternative form:  
H3: The value of cash is higher for firms with the more able CEOs compared to 
the less able CEOs.   
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Sample and data 
The sample period of this study is from 1993 to 2011. Financial data are collected from 
the COMPUSTAT database; stock returns data are from the CRSP database and the Fama and 
French 25 portfolios (Fama and French 1993); and corporate governance and CEO compensation 
data are from the Risk Metrics database and the EXECUCOMP database, respectively. 
Managerial ability data are constructed according to the methodology described in Demerjian et 
al. (2012). The acquisition sample is collected from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) US 
Mergers and Acquisitions database. Particularly, for the M&A analyses, certain criteria will be 
imposed to the M&A sample as in prior studies (e.g., Francis and Martin 2009; Goodman et al. 
2013). I only include the M&A transactions in which the acquiring firms are US public 
companies and their financial and stock return data are available from the COMPUSTAT and the 
CRSP databases. The number of observations varies depending on the specific dependent 
variables in the regressions. Finally, firms in the financial services industries (with SIC codes 
between 6000 and 6999) are excluded from the samples investigated in this study. 
4.2 Empirical models 
I use multivariate regression models to examine the association between managerial 
ability and M&A quality, capital investment efficiency, and the value of cash. In the next section, 
I discuss the dependent and independent variables.  
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4.2.1 Dependent variables 
For the M&A analysis, as in Goodman et al. (2013), I measure M&A quality through an 
ex ante estimate, the market reactions to M&A announcements (3-day abnormal stock return 
around M&A announcement, CAR), and three other ex post performance proxies, including post-
acquisition change in operating performance (CHG_CF and CHG_ROA), the likelihood and the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment in post-acquisition periods (GOODWILL_DUM and 
GOODWILL), and post-acquisition probability of divestiture (DIVESTITURE).  
For the capital investment analysis, the dependent variables are the total capital 
investment (INVT_TOT) and its major components, including capital expenditure (CAPX), R&D 
expenditure (R&D), and acquisition expenditure (ACQ). In addition to the actual investment 
levels, I also look at the abnormal capital investment, which is the difference between actual 
investment and expected investment (McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle et al. 2009).  
Furthermore, by including the variable managerial ability in the regression model adopted 
in Faulkender and Wang (2006), I investigate the association between managerial ability and the 
value of cash. I measure the value of cash as the stock return resulting from a one dollar change 
in cash, and I measure the impact of managerial ability on the value of cash as the interaction 
between managerial ability and the dollar change in cash. 
4.2.2 Independent Variables  
There are two measures for managerial ability in my study: managerial ability score and 
managerial ability ranking. Both managerial ability measures are constructed through the 
methodology developed in Demerjian et al. (2012). Assuming that more able CEOs are capable 
of generating higher levels of revenue from equivalent levels of inputs, Demerjian et al. (2012) 
introduced a more comprehensive measure of managerial ability which reflects CEOs’ 
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efficiencies in managing firms and producing revenue. Specifically, in the execution stage, data 
envelopment analysis (DEA, hereafter) statistic procedure is applied to generate firm efficiency 
scores, with the underlying rationale of maximizing the output, the revenue, while minimizing 
the inputs, including the cost of inventory, general and administrative expenses, operating leases, 
R&D, fixed assets, and intangible assets (Demerjian et al. 2012). The DEA procedure is 
conducted every year for each industry. According to Demerjian et al. (2012), all firm efficiency 
scores are deflated by the highest efficiency score within a certain group to construct an ordinal 
scale in terms of relative efficiency. Firm efficiency scores generated in this way are then used as 
the dependent variable in the second step to separate managerial factors from firm 
characteristics.
4
 The managerial ability scores are the residuals in the regression of total firm 
efficiency on certain observable firm-specific characteristics such as firm size, market share, firm 
age, free cash flow, among others. The ability ranking is then constructed based on ability scores 
(the residuals) such that values are non-negative. Specially, for M&A analyses, I use 3-year 
average CEO managerial ability scores (ABILITY_SCORE_AVG) and 3-year average CEO 
managerial ability rankings (ABILITY_RANKING_AVG) to indicate CEO average managerial 
ability before M&A activities.
5
 
                                                          
4
 This second step regression is estimated by industry and year fixed effects are included, as described in Demerjian 
et al. (2012).   
5
 I also use the ability scores and rankings in the last period and their averages in the last 5 years prior to M&A. 
When using previous year’s managerial ability measures, the results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar for the 3-
day stock returns, change in ROA, and divestiture. However, the negative effect of managerial ability on change in 
operating cash flows no longer exists. Managerial ability score is not significantly associated with the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment, but is significantly and negatively associated with goodwill impairment magnitude. When 
using previous 5-year average measures of managerial ability, the results (untabulated) on the 3-day cumulative 
return, post-acquisition operating performance, and possibility of divestiture are similar to those with precious 3-
year’s managerial ability measures. Although I do not find significant associations between managerial ability score 
and the likelihood and the magnitude of goodwill impairment, I find a significant and negative association between 
managerial ability ranking and the likelihood of goodwill impairment. 
 33 
 
4.2.3 Models testing managerial ability and M&A quality  
H1 predicts that higher ability CEOs are more likely to make higher quality M&A 
decisions. I estimate Model (1) to examine this hypothesis. Specifically, for the dependent 
variables of 3-day cumulative stock returns, changes in operating performance, and the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment, I use OLS regressions. For the dependent variables of 
likelihood of impairment and divestiture, I use logistic regressions. I control for year and 
industry effects in the model. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and fiscal year levels.  
M&A_QUALITY= β0 + β1 ABILITY_AVG + β2 SIZEt-1 + β3 TOBINQt-1 + β4 ROAt-1  
                              + β5 GROWTHt-1 + β6 FCFt-1 + β7 LEVERAGEt-1 + β8 PRE_RETm-13,m-1     
                              + β9 CASH_DEALt + β10 STOCK_DEALt + β11 PUBLICt  
                              + β12 DOMESTICt + β13 RELATIVE_SIZEt + β14 BIDDERSt  
                              + β15 DIVERSIFYINGt + β16 E_INDEXt + β17 CEO_CHAIRt-1 
                              + β18 EQUITY_COMPt-1 +YEAR DUMMIES  
                              + INDUSTRY DUMMIES + et,                                                      (1) 
where MA_QUALITY = abnormal stock return around M&A announcement (CAR), or post-
acquisition change in performance (CHG_CF or CHG_ROA), or likelihood of goodwill 
impairment (GOODWILL_DUM), or magnitude of goodwill impairment (GOODWILL), or the 
probability of divestiture (DIVESTITURE); ABILITY_AVG = three-year average CEO managerial 
ability scores (ABILITY_SCORE_AVG) or CEO managerial ability rankings 
(ABILITY_RANKING_AVG) before a M&A activity; SIZE = natural log of total assets; TOBINQ 
= (market value of equity + the book value of short and long term debt) / total assets; ROA = net 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, scaled by lagged total assets; 
GROWTH = percentage change in sales in a fiscal year; FCF = free cash flow, equaling 
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operating income before depreciation – interest expenses – income taxes – capital expenditures, 
deflated by lagged total assets; LEVERAGE = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
PRE_RET = stock return (buy and hold) over a 12-month period starting from 13 months before 
the acquisition announcement; CASH_DEAL = an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is a purely 
cash deal, and 0 otherwise; STOCK_RDEAL = an indicator variable equal to 1 if it is a purely 
stock deal, and 0 otherwise; PUBLIC = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is publicly 
traded, and 0 otherwise; DOMESTIC = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target is a not a U.S. 
company, and 0 otherwise; RELATIVE_SIZE = the deal value scaled by the acquirer’s market 
value; BIDDERS = an indicator variable equal to 1 if there is more than one bidder for the target 
firm, and 0 otherwise; DIVERSIFYING = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the target and the 
acquirer have different 2-digit SIC codes, and 0 otherwise; E_INDEX = management 
entrenchment index, constructed according to Bebchuk et al. (2009), with a higher index level 
indicating stronger management entrenchment; CEO_CHAIR = an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the CEO is also the chair of the board, and 0 otherwise; and EQUITY_COMP = the percentage of 
equity compensation to total compensation; equity compensation is a sum of options and stocks.  
I predict that the dependent variable, M&A_QUALITY, is positively associated with the 
proxies for managerial ability. Thus, the coefficient on ABILITY is expected to be positive. All 
variable definitions are shown in Appendix A. 
Following prior research on M&As, I use cumulative abnormal stock return around M&A 
announcements as an ex ante proxy for the quality of M&A decisions. Assuming that the market 
is efficient, announcement returns can be an unbiased estimate reflecting the market participants’ 
perception of whether a M&A event is value-increasing (e.g., Halpern 1983; Jensen and Ruback 
1983; Lehn and Zhao 2006; Masulis et al. 2007; Francis and Martin 2010; Goodman et al. 2013). 
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The 3-day, [-1, +1], cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over M&A announcements are 
measured using the market model (Model 2 below).  
Rit = αi + βiRmt + et,                                                                                                         (2) 
where Rit = stock return for firm i over the 200-day period from event day (M&A announcement 
day) –210 to event day –11; and Rmt = CRSP equal-weighted return over the 200-day period from 
event day –210 to event day –11. 
The coefficients estimated from Model (2) are then used to obtain abnormal returns with 
the following model (Model 3): 
CAR = Rit - i - i Rmt,                                                                                                                                                         (3) 
where Rit = stock return for firm i over the 3-day period from event day –1 to event day +1; and 
Rmt = CRSP equal-weighted return over the 3-day period from event day –1 to event day +1. 
Unlike the above abnormal stock return proxy, the other three proxies are ex post 
estimates. Using the post-acquisition change in operating performance can shed light on whether 
M&A decisions have positive effects on corporate performance in the following years. As in 
Francis et al. (2010) and Goodman et al. (2013), I look at the post-acquisition change in return on 
assets (CHG_ROA) and in operating cash flow (CHG_CF). Cash flow will be deflated by total 
assets so that this measure is comparable across firms. More specifically, the average returns on 
assets/cash flows from operations in the 3 years following the acquisition completion will be 
compared to the average pre-acquisition returns on assets/cash flow from operations in the 3 
years before the acquisition, and a difference measure will be derived.
6
  
Goodwill is one outcome of M&A activities, representing rents expected from an 
acquisition and to some extent relying on firms’ future management and strategy implementation 
                                                          
6
 As in Francis et al. (2010) and Goodman et al. (2013), I require acquiring companies to have at least 1 year of 
return on assets data and 1 year of cash flow data in the 3 year periods before and after an acquisition, respectively. 
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(Ramanna and Watts 2010). Goodwill reflects the quality of M&A where goodwill was 
generated. Therefore, goodwill impairment signals a misevaluation, thus lower quality of M&A 
activities (Doellman and Ryngaert 2010; Li et al. 2010; Gu and Lev 2011). Particularly, Gu and 
Lev (2011) find that the magnitude of share overpricing of the acquiring firm is consistently and 
positively associated with the extent of goodwill those acquiring firms recognized. Gu and Lev 
(2011) also state that acquisitions by overpriced companies are often overpaid and strategic 
misfits, and a later goodwill write-off is an important event highlighting a dysfunctional 
investment strategy (Gu and Lev 2011). Another work, Li et al. (2010), also reveals that the 
over-payment to targets can predict subsequent goodwill impairment. Consistent with Goodman 
et al. (2013), I examine both the likelihood (GOODWILL_DUM) and the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment (GOODWILL) in the three years after M&A. I expect that M&A conducted by more 
able CEOs are less likely to document goodwill impairment in the post-acquisition periods; if 
they are impaired, the magnitude of goodwill impairment is smaller.  
The last proxy for M&A quality is the possibility of divestitures (DIVESTITURE) after 
firms engaged in M&A. Prior literature posits that post-acquisition divestitures usually suggest 
poor acquisition strategies (Mitchell and Lehn 1990; Kaplan and Weisbach 1992). Two later 
works, Francis and Martin (2010) and Goodman et al. (2013), adopt the possibility of 
divestitures as one of the measures for the success of M&A activities to investigate how 
corporate accounting and disclosure practices impact the M&A quality.
7
Divestitures and 
goodwill impairment together address the issue of failures in prior M&A activities in a more 
comprehensive way because a firm might just divest a poor acquisition instead of holding the 
acquired firm and recognizing goodwill impairment (Goodman et al. 2013). I expect that M&A 
                                                          
7
 Francis and Martin (2010) show that firms adopt more conservative accounting practice are less likely to 
experience divestiture. Goodman et al. (2013) reveal that firms have better management forecast quality have 
smaller likelihood of subsequent divestures after they conducted M&A. 
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conducted by more able CEOs are less likely to experience divestitures in the subsequent years. 
DIVESTITURE is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if an acquisition results in a 
subsequent divestiture, and 0 otherwise. A circumstance of divestiture is defined if the target 
acquired at the acquisition date has the same 4-digit SIC code as the divested unit over a 5-year 
post-acquisition period.  
As indicated by the prior literature (e.g., Masulis et al. 2007; Goodman et al. 2013), I 
control three sets of variables in the M&A analyses: firm financial characteristics, deal 
characteristics, and corporate governance and CEO compensation characteristics. In terms of 
financial characteristics, I control for firm size (SIZE), Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ), return on assets 
(ROA), sales growth (GROWTH), free cash flow (FCF), leverage (LEV), and pre-acquisition 
stock return (PRE_RET). Moeller et al. (2004) show evidence that the size of an acquiring firm is 
negatively related to the acquiring firms’ announcement-period cumulative abnormal return, 
indicating that, on average, larger acquiring firms make over-valued acquisitions that generate 
negative benefits. This finding is consistent with the managerial hubris hypothesis in Roll (1986), 
who claims that managers of large firms are very likely to commit M&A due to hubris. Tobin’s 
Q, the return on assets, and sales growth indicate firms’ growth opportunities and can affect 
M&A decision-making (Moeller et al. 2004; Dong et al. 2006). Prior research on the relation 
between Tobin’s Q and stock market performance around M&A announcement is mixed: Lang 
et al. (1991) and Servaes (1991) find that Tobin’s Q is positively associated with the stock 
market reaction to the announcements of tender offer acquisitions and public firms acquisitions, 
while Moeller et al. (2004) show an opposite finding in which there is a negative association 
between Tobin’s Q and the market performance around announcements. Free cash flow and 
leverage are controlled because the level of free cash can indicate agency conflicts between 
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managers and shareholders, and the level of leverage suggests the possible strength of 
monitoring effects from debtors, which can prevent value-reducing investment decisions to some 
extent (Jensen 1986). The free cash flow hypothesis in Jensen (1986) proposes that free cash 
flows grants managers more available resources to pursue excessive investments which can harm 
shareholder interest. Leverage potentially limits managerial discretion regarding over-investment 
because of increasing monitoring from creditors (e.g., Jensen 1986; Masulis et al. 2007). 
Empirical evidence from Maloney et al. (1993) also documents a positive relation between the 
leverage of acquiring firms and the abnormal return around M&A announcements. Rosen (2006) 
documents that the broad market condition has an impact on the market’s response to M&A 
announcements. Specifically, the market tends to continue to react favorably to M&A 
announcements if it has been doing that for some time, and M&A announced during hot stock 
markets are inclined to experience a more positive market reaction than those announced during 
cold periods (Rosen 2006). Hence, in order to isolate the overall market condition effect, I 
control for the acquiring firm’ pre-acquisition stock returns. 
In addition to financial characteristics, I also control for certain deal characteristics that 
can potentially indicate or impact the quality of M&A according to prior literature: payment 
methods (CASH_DEAL and STOCK_DEAL), whether the target is publicly traded or not 
(PUBLIC), the country of the target (DOMESTIC), the relative deal size (RELATIVE_SIZE), 
number of bidders (BIDDERS), and whether the acquisition is a diversifying one 
(DIVERSIFYING). Both Travlos (1987) and Wansley et al. (1987) find negative abnormal 
returns to M&A deals financed through new stocks and no abnormal returns for those financed 
with cash. In later work, Chang (1998) demonstrates that whether the market reacts more 
positively to stock payment or cash payment depends on whether the targets are publicly traded 
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or not. When the targets are privately held rather than publicly traded, bidders issuing common 
stocks to finance acquisitions experience a positive abnormal return, while those offering cash 
have a zero abnormal return. In a similar vein, Fuller et al. (2002) show that bidders acquiring 
private targets experience significantly favorable returns compared to those purchasing publicly 
traded targets. A further investigation on the interaction effect between payment types and public 
status of target firms by Fuller et al. (2002) finds that acquisitions of public targets bring 
insignificant market returns to bidders if cash or combination payments were used, but bring 
significantly negative returns if stock payments were used. As well, the acquisitions of private or 
subsidiary targets bring significantly positive returns to acquiring firms, regardless of methods of 
payments (Fuller et al. 2002). Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002) attribute their findings to the 
liquidation effect and blockholder effect. The lack of liquidity of private or subsidiary firms 
makes those investments less attractive, thus acquiring firms can capture this discount through 
investing in privately held firms or subsidiaries. Meanwhile, the likelihood of forming a 
concentrated ownership in private targets is higher, especially as the relative size increases, and 
the existence of a large blockholder can exert greater monitoring effect on the bidder’s 
management, resulting in increased bidder value. Such effects are most significant when the 
target is private and paid with full equity (Martin 1996; Chang 1998; Fuller et al. 2002).  
Prior research has shown that conducting diversifying investment actually indicates 
managers’ ambitions in building empires, and that such investment decisions are usually value-
destroying and associated with lower announcement period returns (Morck et al. 1990). 
Therefore, I control whether an acquisition is diversifying (DIVERSIFYING). I also control the 
relative size of the target to the acquiring firm (RELATIVE_SIZE) because there is an identified 
positive association between abnormal returns and the size of a deal (e.g., Asquith et al. 1983; 
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Moeller et al. 2004). It has been shown that as more competitors compete for the same target, the 
price paid by the acquiring firm will be higher and the returns to such M&A tend to be lower 
(Moeller et al. 2004). Therefore, I control for the number of bidders in M&A transactions 
(BIDDERS). Finally, following Moeller et al. (2004) and Goodman et al. (2013), I control the 
target location−whether the target is located in the U.S. or not (DOMESTIC). 
Prior studies on M&A have found that corporate governance and CEO compensation 
characteristics of the acquiring firms can influence corporate investment practices. Prior studies 
address that managers who are entrenched or have great managerial power are more likely to 
conduct excessive and value-destroying investments including M&A (e.g., Masulis et al. 2007; 
Fahlenbrach 2009). Thus I construct the E-index (E_INDEX) as in Bebchuk et al. (2009) to 
control for management entrenchment. I also control CEO/Chairman duality (CEO_CHAIR) 
because it indicates the power of a CEO and his influence on the board to execute his decisions. 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Masulis et al. (2007) both provide evidence that acquiring firms 
that combine the positions of CEO and the chairman of the board have lower abnormal 
announcement returns. Certain characteristics of CEO compensation are also shown to affect 
CEOs’ decisions on corporate investments. Particularly, Datta et al. (2001) finds positive stock 
market performance around and subsequent to acquisition announcements to acquiring firms 
whose managers receive more intensive equity-based compensation. Therefore, I control for the 
percentage of CEO equity-based compensation to CEO total compensation (EQUITY_COMP) in 
the regression.  
4.2.4 Models testing managerial ability and capital investment efficiency  
Over- or under-investment can occur due to agency problems such as moral hazard and 
adverse selection (e.g., Jensen and Merkling 1976; Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; 
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Lambert et al. 2007; Biddle et al. 2009). I investigate whether high managerial ability is able to 
improve capital investment efficiency when firms are more vulnerable to agency problems, i.e., 
to decrease (increase) investment when it has a tendency of over-investing (under-investing). 
Consistent with the practice in Biddle et al. (2009), I divide the firms into two categories: a more 
likely to over-invest group and a more likely to under-invest group using cash and leverage as 
criteria. The underlying rationale for using these two criteria is that the level of free cash flow 
and leverage may indicate agency problems (e.g., Jensen 1986; Myers and Majluf 1984). I first 
estimate the following OLS regression Model (4) to test the association between managerial 
ability and capital investment levels (or abnormal capital investment levels). I then incorporate 
the variable OVERI, which indicates the likelihood of over-investment, and the interaction 
between OVERI and managerial ability in Model (4) to test my research question (Model 5). I 
control for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects in the model. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm and fiscal year levels.  
INVTi,t+1 (or AB_INVTi,t+1)= β0+ β1 ABILITYi,t + β2 SIZEi,t + β3 MTOBi,t + β4 LOSSi,t 
                                          + β5 SALE_VOLi,t + β6 INVT_VOLi,t + β7 CFO_SALEi,t 
                                          + β8 CFO_VOLi,t + β9 SLACKi,t + β10 DIVi,t + β11 ZSCORE i,t 
                                         + β12 TANGIBILITYi,t  + β13KSTRUCTUREi,t 
                                        + β14IND_KSTRUCTUREi,t+ INDUSTRY DUMMIES  
                                        + YEAR DUMMIES+ ei,t+1,                                                      (4)                           
 
INVTi,t+1 (or AB_INVTi,t+1)= β0+ β1 ABILITYi,t + β2  OVERIi,t+1+β3 OVERIi,t+1* ABILITYi,t 
                                          + β4 SIZEi,t + β5 MTOBi,t + β6 LOSSi,t + β7 SALE_VOLi,t  
                                          + β8 INVT_VOLi,t + β9 CFO_SALEi,t + β10 CFO_VOLi,t  
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                                          + β11 SLACKi,t + β12 DIVi,t + β13 ZSCORE i,t  
                                          + β14 TANGIBILITYi,t  + β15KSTRUCTUREi,t 
                                          + β16 IND_KSTRUCTUREi,t+ INDUSTRY DUMMIES  
                                        + YEAR DUMMIES+ ei,t+1,                                                      (5)                           
where INVT= INVT_TOT, the level of total capital investment, equaling to the sum of capital 
expenditure, R&D expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from the sale of 
property, plant, and equipment, or CAPX, the level of capital expenditure, or R&D, the level of 
R&D expenditure, or ACQ, the level of acquisition expenditure; AB_INVT = AB_TOT, the 
abnormal level of total capital investment, proxied by the residuals from the regression of a 
firm’s total capital investment on lagged sales growth, or AB_CAPX, the abnormal level of 
capital expenditure, proxied by the residuals from the regression of a firm’s capital expenditure 
on lagged sales growth, or AB_R&D, the abnormal level of  R&D expenditure, proxied by the 
residuals from the regression of a firm’s R&D expenditure on lagged sales growth, or AB_ACQ, 
the abnormal level of acquisition expenditure, proxied by the residuals from the regression of a 
firm’s acquisition expenditure on lagged sales growth; ABILITY = CEO managerial ability scores, 
ABILITY_SCORE; or CEO managerial ability rankings, ABILITY_RANKING; OVERI = a 
composite score measure created to indicate the likelihood of over- and under-investment based 
on the ranking of cash and leverage levels; SIZE = natural log of total assets; MTOB = the ratio 
of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets; LOSS = an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if net income before extraordinary items is negative, and 0 otherwise; SALE_VOL = 
standard deviation of the sales scaled by average total assets over previous five years; 
INVT_VOL = standard deviation of investment over previous five years; CFO_SALE = operating 
cash flows divided by sales; CFO_VOL = standard deviation of the cash flow from operations 
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scaled by average total assets over previous five years; SLACK = the ratio of cash to PPE; DIV = 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends, and 0 otherwise; ZSCORE = 
0.033*earnings before extraordinary item/total assets + sales/total assets + 0.014*retained 
earnings/total assets + 0.012*(working capital/total assets) + 0.006*(market value of common 
stock/total liabilities); TANGIBILITY = PPE divided by total assets; KSTRUCTURE = long-term 
debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity; and 
IND_KSTRUCTURE = mean K-structure for firms in the same SIC3-digit industry. 
OVERI is a rank variable used to identify tendency towards over-investment or under-
investment. As in Biddle et al. (2009), I rank firms into deciles according to their cash and 
leverage levels. Leverage is multiplied by -1 before ranking so that it can be interpreted the same 
direction as cash balance. Deciles constructed in this way are re-scaled to range from 0 to 1. I 
then create a composite score measure (OVERI), equaling the mean of the ranked values of the 
two partitioning variables. The OVERI variable is increasing with the trend of over-investment. 
In Model (5), β1 indicates the effect of managerial ability on investment level when under-
investment is most likely, i.e., when OVERI is 0, and β3 measures the incremental effect of 
managerial ability on investment levels, and the sum of β1 and β3 measures the overall effect of 
managerial ability on investment when OVERI is not 0. If more able CEOs make more efficient 
investment decisions, I will observe a positive β1 and a negative β3.    
In addition to the actual level of capital investment, I also look at the association between 
the abnormal capital investment and managerial ability conditional on the tendency to over- and 
under-investment. I use the following Model (5) to estimate the abnormal capital investment. 
Specifically, I conduct industry-year regressions by regressing a firm’s total capital investment 
(or capital expenditure, R&D, and acquisition expenditure, respectively) on lagged sales growth 
 44 
 
(∆SALE) (see Model 5 below). 8  The residuals from this regression are considered as the 
abnormal total capital investment (or the abnormal capital expenditure, abnormal R&D, and the 
abnormal acquisition expenditure depending on the dependent variables).
9
  
INVTi,t+1 = β0 +  β1 ∆SALEi,t + ei,t+1,                                                                                                                           (6) 
Where INVT = INVT_TOT, the level of total capital investment, equaling to the sum of capital 
expenditure, R&D expenditure, and acquisition expenditure less cash receipts from the sale of 
property, plant, and equipment, or CAPX, the level of capital expenditure, or R&D, the level of 
R&D expenditure, or ACQ, the level of acquisition expenditure; and ∆SALE = sales growth. 
Following Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Biddle et al. (2009),  I include several control 
variables, such as firm size (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MTOB), the return on assets (ROA), 
loss (LOSS), sales volatility (SALE_VOL), investment volatility (INVT_VOL), cash flow to sale 
ratio (CFO_SALE), cash flow volatility (CFO_VOL), cash to PPE ratio (SLACK), dividend (DIV), 
the possibility of bankruptcy measured as in Altman (1968) (ZSCORE), the ratio of PPE to total 
assets (TANGIBILIT), capital structure (KSTRUCTURE), and leverage (IND_STRUCTURE). 
Among these variables, sales volatility, return on assets, and loss indicate firm performance and 
profitability.  Both firm size and market-to-book ratio represent growth opportunities, and cash 
flow to sale ratio, cash flow volatility, cash to PPE ratio, dividend, the possibility of bankruptcy, 
and capital structure suggest free cash availability, the degree of financial constraint, and the 
magnitude of agency problems, respectively.   
4.2.5 Models testing managerial ability and the value of cash  
In order to investigate H3, whether CEO managerial ability is positively related to the 
value of cash of the firm operated by that CEO, I adopt the method of evaluating the value of 
                                                          
8
 I require at least 20 observations for each year and a certain industry. 
9
 In this sense, the more positive (negative) the residuals, the greater magnitude of over-investment (under-
investment).  
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cash developed by Faulkender and Wang (2006) and incorporate managerial ability in it as 
follows (Model 6). This model regresses excess return on changes in cash while controlling other 
firm characteristics such as profitability, financial status, and investment practice, with all 
independent variables scaled by the beginning market value of equity (Mi, t-1). In this way, the 
coefficient of the interaction between managerial ability and the dollar change in cash, β12, 
indicates the incremental effect of managerial ability on the value of cash held by the firm and is 
expected to be positive according to H3.  
EX_RETi,t = β0 + β1 + β2 ABILITYi,t + β3 ABILITYi,t ×  + β4  + β5 + β6  + 
β7  + β8 + β9  + β10 Li,t + β11   + β12  × + β13 Li,t ×  + ei,t,,                 
(7) 
where EX_RETi = a stock’s excess return over the fiscal year - stock i’s return during fiscal year t 
(computed using monthly returns from CRSP) less the return of stock i’s size and book-to-
market matched portfolio during fiscal year t constructed through the method in Fama and 
French (1993);
10
 ∆C = change in cash and marketable securities; ABILITY = CEO managerial 
ability scores, ABILITY_SCORE, or CEO managerial ability rankings, ABILITY_RANKING; ∆E 
= change in earnings before extraordinary items; ∆NA = change in total assets subtract cash; 
∆RD = change in R&D (0 if missing); ∆ I = change in interest expenses; ∆ D = change in 
common dividends distributed to common stock; C = cash and marketable securities; L = total 
debt divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity; NF = new 
finance in year t, including net new equity issues and net new debt issues; and M = market value 
of equity. 
                                                          
10
 The 25 Fama and French portfolios, constructed on size and book-to-market, are value-weighted returns and will 
be used as benchmark portfolios to calculate a stock’s excess return. The returns to these portfolios are available 
from the website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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 Further, I incorporate firms’ financial constraint status into the examination of the 
association between managerial ability and the value of cash. Prior studies suggest that firms 
experiencing financial constraints place a higher value on their cash because the availability of 
cash determines whether those firms can seize favorable investment opportunities (Myers and 
Majluf 1984; Fazzari et al. 1988; Faulkender and Wang 2006; Denis and Sibilkov 2010). Using 
the four criteria proposed by Almeida et al. (2004) and Denis and Sibilkov (2010) to sort firms, I 
study the pattern of the effect of managerial ability on the value of cash across financially 
constrained firms and financially unconstrained firms. 
The first criterion is the annual payout ratio: dividends and common stock repurchases 
divided by operating income. For each year, I classify firms in the bottom (top) three deciles of 
the annual cash payout ratio distribution as the financially constrained (unconstrained) group. 
The next criterion is firm size. Firms are ranked based on their book value of total assets each 
year, and the bottom (top) three deciles of the distribution are classified as the financially 
constrained (unconstrained) group. Debt rating is the third criterion. Firms are considered to be 
financially unconstrained if they have had their long-term debt rated by Standard & Poor 
(available in the COMPUSTAT database) and their debts are not in default (a rating of “D” or 
“SD”); firms are considered constrained if they have debt outstanding that year but have never 
had their public debt rated before (or the long-term debt rating is unavailable). Firms with no 
debt outstanding are considered unconstrained. The last criterion is paper rating. Consistent with 
Denis and Sibilkov (2010), if firms have had their short-term debts rated by S&P’s and their 
debts are not in default, they are labeled financially unconstrained. Conversely, if they have debt 
outstanding that year, but have never had their short-term debt rated before (or the rating is 
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unavailable), they are labeled as financially constrained. Similar to the situation of debt ratings, 
firms with no short-term debt outstanding are treated as financially unconstrained. Model (6) is 
tested in the financially constrained group and financially unconstrained group, respectively, as 
classified by the above four criteria. 
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CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Managerial ability and M&A quality 
After eliminating observations with missing values in the variables of Model (1), sample 
sizes vary across the four dependent variables in this set of analyses. In Table 1, I present the 
distribution of M&A sample by the two-digit SIC industry code. The industry with the highest 
frequency is Industrial Machinery and Computer Equipment (14.69 percent, SIC code 35), 
followed by Business Services (14.29 percent, SIC code 73), and Instruments and Related 
Products (12.74 percent, SIC code 38). 
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Table 1: Distribution of Firm-Year Observations by Industry of M&A sample 
 
  
Two-digit 
SIC 
# of 
Obs. 
 
% of 
Sample 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Metal Mining, Ores 10 
 
26 
 
0.81 0.99 
Oil and Gas 13 
 
127 
 
3.94 4.93 
Food, Beverage 20 
 
79 
 
2.45 7.38 
Textile Mill Products 22 
 
18 
 
0.56 7.94 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 23 
 
24 
 
0.74 8.68 
Lumber and Wood Products 24 
 
17 
 
0.53 9.21 
Furniture and Fixtures 25 
 
25 
 
0.77 9.98 
Paper and Allied Products 26 
 
46 
 
1.43 11.41 
Printing and Publishing 27 
 
60 
 
1.86 13.27 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 
 
256 
 
7.94 21.21 
Petroleum 29 
 
19 
 
0.59 21.8 
Rubber 30 
 
26 
 
0.81 22.61 
Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 32 
 
21 
 
0.65 23.26 
Primary Metal Industries 33 
 
79 
 
2.45 25.71 
Fabricated Metal Products 34 
 
59 
 
1.83 27.54 
Industrial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35 
 
474 
 
14.69 42.23 
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 36 
 
389 
 
12.06 54.29 
Transportation Equipment 37 
 
104 
 
3.22 57.51 
Instruments and Related Products 38 
 
411 
 
12.74 70.25 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 39 
 
36 
 
1.12 71.37 
Water Transportation 44 
 
17 
 
0.53 71.9 
Communication 48 
 
64 
 
1.98 73.88 
Wholesale—Durable Goods 50 
 
46 
 
1.43 75.31 
Wholesale—Non-Durable Goods 51 
 
14 
 
0.43 75.74 
General Merchandise Store 53 
 
23 
 
0.71 76.45 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 
 
15 
 
0.46 76.91 
Eating and Drinking 58 
 
27 
 
0.84 77.75 
Miscellaneous Retail 59 
 
14 
 
0.43 78.18 
Personal Services 72 
 
16 
 
0.5 78.68 
Business Services 73 
 
461 
 
14.29 92.97 
Health Services 80 
 
62 
 
1.92 94.89 
Social Services 83 
 
14 
 
0.43 95.32 
Engineering and Management Services 87 
 
42 
 
1.3 96.62 
Other Industries
11
 
 
115 
 
3.38         100.00 
Total 
  
3226 
 
100 
  
                                                          
11
 Industries whose observations are less than 10 are aggregated into this category. 
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Descriptive statistics of the M&A sample are tabulated in Table 2, Panels A through D. 
The 3-day cumulative abnormal return has a mean value of 0.003 and a median of 0.002, the 
change in ROA has a mean value of -0.022 and a median of -0.012, and the change in cash flow 
has a mean of -0.020 and a median of -0.013. In the goodwill impairment sample, an average of 
30 percent of the M&A experience goodwill impairment, and the average goodwill impairment 
size is $73.209 million. In the divestiture sample, 38.8 percent of the M&A experience 
divestiture in the next five years. In terms of the variables of interest and the control variables, by 
looking at the stock market reaction example, the managerial ability score has a mean of 0.028 
and a median of 0.018, and managerial ability ranking has a mean of 0.626 and a median of 
0.633. The sample has a mean firm size of 7.758, and an average ROA of 0.072. About 63.6 
percent of the M&A are purely cash deals, and 13 percent are purely stock deals. In addition, 
26.7 percent of the targets are public trading firms, and 23.8 percent of the targets are foreign 
firms. Finally, about 55 percent of the CEOs in the sample are also the chair of the board.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the M&A sample 
 
Panel  A: Stock market reaction 
    
 
  N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
        ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 3226 0.028 0.121 -0.049 0.018 0.100 
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 3226 0.626 0.229 0.450 0.633 0.800 
CAR 
 
3226 0.003 0.052 -0.020 0.002 0.025 
SIZE 
 
3226 7.758 1.527 6.630 7.556 8.751 
TOBINQ 
 
3226 2.475 2.029 1.388 1.843 2.664 
ROA 
 
3226 0.072 0.114 0.036 0.070 0.110 
GROWTH 3226 0.089 0.235 0.019 0.100 0.194 
FCF 
 
3226 0.066 0.099 0.031 0.067 0.107 
LEVERAGE 3226 0.481 0.197 0.340 0.488 0.599 
PRE_RET 3226 0.214 0.567 -0.091 0.138 0.390 
CASH_DEAL 3226 0.636 0.481 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STOCK_DEAL 3226 0.130 0.336 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PUBLIC 
 
3226 0.267 0.442 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DOMESTIC 3226 0.238 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 51 
 
RELATIVE_SIZE 3226 0.056 0.105 0.005 0.018 0.060 
BIDDERS 3226 0.023 0.151 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIVERSIFYING 3226 0.446 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
E_INDEX 3226 2.237 1.390 1.000 2.000 3.000 
CEO_CHAIR 3226 0.549 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EQUITY_COMP 3226 0.479 0.297 0.253 0.520 0.717 
 
Panel B: Post-acquisition operating performance 
   
  
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
        ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 2898 0.029 0.121 -0.049 0.019 0.103 
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 2898 0.629 0.228 0.450 0.633 0.800 
CHG_ROA 2898 -0.022 0.104 -0.053 -0.012 0.016 
CHG_CF  2898 -0.020 0.080 -0.050 -0.013 0.020 
SIZE 
 
2898 7.769 1.521 6.651 7.582 8.753 
TOBINQ 
 
2898 2.536 2.096 1.398 1.869 2.711 
ROA 
 
2898 0.073 0.116 0.037 0.072 0.113 
GROWTH 2898 0.093 0.228 0.021 0.102 0.195 
FCF 
 
2898 0.069 0.096 0.033 0.068 0.109 
LEVERAGE 2898 0.481 0.198 0.340 0.489 0.597 
PRE_RET 2898 0.223 0.577 -0.084 0.143 0.397 
CASH_DEAL 2898 0.633 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STOCK_DEAL 2898 0.133 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PUBLIC 
 
2898 0.263 0.440 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DOMESTIC 2898 0.232 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RELATIVE_SIZE 2898 0.055 0.102 0.005 0.018 0.058 
BIDDERS 2898 0.016 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIVERSIFYING 2898 0.449 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
E_INDEX 2898 2.237 1.394 1.000 2.000 3.000 
CEO_CHAIR 2898 0.545 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EQUITY_COMP 2898 0.484 0.297 0.264 0.524 0.719 
 
Panel C: Goodwill impairment  
     
  
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
        ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 730 0.031 0.116 -0.052 0.017 0.107 
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 730 0.629 0.224 0.433 0.633 0.833 
GOODWILL_DUM 730 0.300 0.459 0.000 0.000 1.000 
GOODWILL 730 73.209 347.427 0.000 0.000 15.000 
SIZE 
 
730 7.301 1.312 6.333 7.155 8.022 
TOBINQ 
 
730 2.374 1.575 1.449 1.906 2.666 
ROA 
 
730 0.075 0.101 0.049 0.077 0.111 
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GROWTH 730 0.089 0.283 0.040 0.111 0.193 
FCF 
 
730 0.084 0.075 0.051 0.077 0.116 
LEVERAGE 730 0.453 0.215 0.308 0.450 0.565 
PRE_RET 730 0.224 0.585 -0.071 0.157 0.397 
CASH_DEAL 730 0.658 0.475 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STOCK_DEAL 730 0.045 0.208 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PUBLIC 
 
730 0.244 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DOMESTIC 730 0.201 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RELATIVE_SIZE 730 0.087 0.128 0.011 0.041 0.111 
BIDDERS 730 0.019 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIVERSIFYING 730 0.448 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
E_INDEX 730 2.370 1.371 1.000 2.000 3.000 
CEO_CHAIR 730 0.510 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EQUITY_COMP 730 0.485 0.293 0.250 0.534 0.731 
       
Panel D: Divestiture 
      
  
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
        ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 2966 0.028 0.120 -0.049 0.019 0.101 
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 2966 0.627 0.228 0.433 0.633 0.800 
DIVEST 
 
2966 0.388 0.487 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SIZE 
 
2966 7.756 1.524 6.634 7.561 8.749 
TOBINQ 
 
2966 2.522 2.079 1.398 1.858 2.708 
ROA 
 
2966 0.072 0.116 0.036 0.071 0.113 
GROWTH 2966 0.092 0.227 0.021 0.101 0.195 
FCF 
 
2966 0.068 0.097 0.033 0.068 0.109 
LEVERAGE 2966 0.479 0.197 0.338 0.487 0.597 
PRE_RET 2966 0.222 0.579 -0.088 0.141 0.396 
CASH_DEAL 2966 0.633 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000 
STOCK_DEAL 2966 0.131 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PUBLIC 
 
2966 0.261 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DOMESTIC 2966 0.232 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RELATIVE_SIZE 2966 0.055 0.104 0.005 0.018 0.058 
BIDDERS 2966 0.016 0.124 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DIVERSIFYING 2966 0.449 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
E_INDEX 2966 2.236 1.389 1.000 2.000 3.000 
CEO_CHAIR 2966 0.548 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EQUITY_COMP 2966 0.483 0.297 0.261 0.525 0.720 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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 Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics by low versus high managerial ability, using the 
industry median of the managerial ability score as a benchmark.
12
 According to Panel A of Table 
3, both the managerial ability score and the ranking are statistically higher in the high ability 
group, as indicated by the significant p-value from both t-tests and Wilcoxon Tests. The 3-day 
cumulative abnormal return is not statistically different. Turning to the control variables, high 
ability CEOs are more likely to acquire private companies and use stock to finance M&A. Firms 
with high ability CEOs have more investment opportunities as indicated by higher Tobin’s Q, 
better firm performance as indicated by ROA, higher growth, more free cash flow, and lower 
leverage. As well, high ability CEOs are less likely to have dual positions and have higher 
percentages of equity compensation. In Panel B, ROA and operating cash flows are worse in the 
post-acquisition period as indicated by the negative means and medians. However, the change in 
ROA and the change in operating cash flows are even more negative in firms with high ability 
CEOs. Panel C shows that the likelihood of goodwill impairment is lower and the magnitude of 
goodwill impairment is smaller for the M&A conducted by high ability CEOs, and Panel D 
shows that he probability of divesting is lower for the M&As conducted by high ability CEOs.  
                                                          
12
 I mainly discuss the statistics of all variables in Panel A of Table 3 and the statistics of the dependent variables in 
Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D of Table 3.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of M&A sample by Low versus High Managerial Ability 
 
 
Panel A: Stock market reaction  
  
Low Ability 
 
High Ability Difference Tests 
  
N Mean SD Median 
 
N Mean SD Median t-test Wilcoxon 
           
(p-value) (p-value) 
ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 1595 -0.065 0.069 -0.049 
 
1631 0.120 0.087 0.099 0.000 0.000 
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 1595 0.439 0.150 0.433 
 
1631 0.809 0.119 0.800 0.000 0.000 
CAR 
 
1595 0.003 0.053 0.002 
 
1631 0.003 0.051 0.002 0.903 0.984 
SIZE 
 
1595 7.771 1.684 7.465 
 
1631 7.745 1.355 7.620 0.634 0.120 
TOBINQ 
 
1595 2.102 1.319 1.696 
 
1631 2.841 2.484 1.981 0.000 0.000 
ROA 
 
1595 0.056 0.095 0.058 
 
1631 0.087 0.128 0.086 0.000 0.000 
GROWTH 1595 0.069 0.227 0.087 
 
1631 0.109 0.240 0.111 0.000 0.000 
FCF 
 
1595 0.051 0.089 0.056 
 
1631 0.081 0.106 0.077 0.000 0.000 
LEVERAGE 1595 0.499 0.195 0.501 
 
1631 0.462 0.198 0.475 0.000 0.000 
PRE_RET 1595 0.212 0.549 0.131 
 
1631 0.217 0.584 0.144 0.827 0.975 
CASH_DEAL 1595 0.638 0.481 1.000 
 
1631 0.635 0.482 1.000 0.829 0.829 
STOCK_DEAL 1595 0.108 0.311 0.000 
 
1631 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PUBLIC 
 
1595 0.288 0.453 0.000 
 
1631 0.245 0.430 0.000 0.006 0.006 
DOMESTIC 1595 0.247 0.431 0.000 
 
1631 0.230 0.421 0.000 0.255 0.255 
RELATIVE_SIZE 1595 0.062 0.108 0.020 
 
1631 0.051 0.102 0.016 0.003 0.001 
BIDDERS 1595 0.023 0.149 0.000 
 
1631 0.024 0.153 0.000 0.801 0.801 
DIVERSIFYING 1595 0.432 0.496 0.000 
 
1631 0.459 0.498 0.000 0.120 0.120 
E_INDEX 1595 2.255 1.376 2.000 
 
1631 2.219 1.404 2.000 0.466 0.481 
CEO_CHAIR 1595 0.581 0.494 1.000 
 
1631 0.518 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.000 
EQUITY_COMP 1595 0.458 0.288 0.490 
 
1631 0.500 0.305 0.542 0.000 0.000 
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Panel B: Post-acquisition operating performance 
         
   
Low Ability 
 
  
High Ability Difference Tests 
  
N Mean SD Median 
 
N Mean SD Median t-test Wilcoxon 
           
(p-value) (p-value) 
ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 1435 -0.064 0.071 -0.049 1463 0.12 0.085 0.101 0.000 0.000 
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 1435 0.444 0.151 0.433 1463 0.809 0.119 0.800 0.000 0.000 
CHG_ROA 1435 -0.013 0.086 -0.007 1463 -0.030 0.119 -0.018 0.000 0.000 
CHG_CF  1435 -0.009 0.066 -0.007 1463 -0.030 0.091 -0.020 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 
 
1435 7.807 1.679 7.536 1463 7.732 1.347 7.610 0.186 0.665 
TOBINQ 
 
1435 2.146 1.358 1.722 1463 2.919 2.569 2.013 0.000 0.000 
ROA 
 
1435 0.058 0.095 0.060 1463 0.087 0.133 0.088 0.000 0.000 
GROWTH 1435 0.071 0.227 0.090 1463 0.114 0.226 0.114 0.000 0.000 
FCF 
 
1435 0.054 0.084 0.058 1463 0.085 0.103 0.077 0.000 0.000 
LEVERAGE 1435 0.501 0.192 0.504 1463 0.460 0.200 0.473 0.000 0.000 
PRE_RET 1435 0.226 0.565 0.141 1463 0.221 0.589 0.146 0.842 0.791 
CASH_DEAL 1435 0.630 0.483 1.000 1463 0.636 0.481 1.000 0.750 0.750 
STOCK_DEAL 1435 0.114 0.317 0.000 1463 0.152 0.359 0.000 0.003 0.003 
PUBLIC 
 
1435 0.287 0.453 0.000 1463 0.239 0.426 0.000 0.003 0.003 
DOMESTIC 1435 0.237 0.425 0.000 1463 0.228 0.419 0.000 0.553 0.553 
RELATIVE_SIZE 1435 0.060 0.107 0.020 1463 0.049 0.097 0.016 0.004 0.006 
BIDDERS 1435 0.014 0.117 0.000 1463 0.017 0.130 0.000 0.493 0.493 
DIVERSIFYING 1435 0.432 0.496 0.000 1463 0.466 0.499 0.000 0.065 0.065 
E_INDEX 1435 2.274 1.366 2.000 1463 2.200 1.420 2.000 0.155 0.124 
CEO_CHAIR 1435 0.582 0.493 1.000 1463 0.508 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.000 
EQUITY_COMP 1435 0.463 0.286 0.495 1463 0.504 0.305 0.544 0.000 0.000 
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Panel C: Goodwill impairment   
         
   
Low Ability 
 
  
High Ability Difference Tests 
  
N Mean SD Median 
 
N Mean SD Median t-test Wilcoxon 
           
(p-value) (p-value) 
ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 355 -0.059 0.061 -0.055 375 0.116 0.089 0.105 0.000 0.000 
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 355 0.454 0.152 0.433 375 0.795 0.138 0.800 0.000 0.000 
GOODWILL_DUM 355 0.341 0.475 0.000 375 0.261 0.440 0.000 0.019 0.019 
GOODWILL 355 100.077 455.645 0.000 375 47.774 193.483 0.000 0.042 0.014 
SIZE 
 
355 7.150 1.310 6.994 375 7.444 1.299 7.395 0.002 0.001 
TOBINQ 355 2.275 1.391 1.888 375 2.467 1.729 1.922 0.098 0.337 
ROA 
 
355 0.066 0.091 0.070 375 0.084 0.108 0.088 0.015 0.000 
GROWTH 355 0.089 0.268 0.106 375 0.088 0.297 0.112 0.975 0.751 
FCF 
 
355 0.074 0.067 0.072 375 0.093 0.080 0.085 0.001 0.001 
LEVERAGE 355 0.452 0.208 0.441 375 0.454 0.222 0.451 0.916 0.984 
PRE_RET 355 0.239 0.570 0.150 375 0.211 0.599 0.165 0.515 0.675 
CASH_DEAL 355 0.617 0.487 1.000 375 0.696 0.461 1.000 0.024 0.025 
STOCK_DEAL 355 0.051 0.220 0.000 375 0.040 0.196 0.000 0.487 0.487 
PUBLIC 355 0.254 0.436 0.000 375 0.235 0.424 0.000 0.554 0.554 
DOMESTIC 355 0.189 0.392 0.000 375 0.213 0.410 0.000 0.408 0.408 
RELATIVE_SIZE 355 0.095 0.127 0.050 375 0.080 0.129 0.034 0.113 0.031 
BIDDERS 355 0.014 0.118 0.000 375 0.024 0.153 0.000 0.330 0.329 
DIVERSIFYING 355 0.406 0.492 0.000 375 0.488 0.501 0.000 0.025 0.025 
E_INDEX 355 2.375 1.344 3.000 375 2.365 1.398 2.000 0.927 0.843 
CEO_CHAIR 355 0.566 0.496 1.000 375 0.456 0.499 0.000 0.003 0.003 
EQUITY_COMP 355 0.445 0.300 0.481 375 0.524 0.280 0.557 0.000 0.000 
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Panel D: Divestiture   
         
   
Low Ability 
 
  
High Ability Difference Tests 
  
N Mean SD Median 
 
N Mean SD Median t-test Wilcoxon 
           
(p-value) (p-value) 
ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 1471 -0.065 0.070 -0.049 1495 0.119 0.085 0.100 0.000 0.000 
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 1471 0.441 0.150 0.433 1495 0.809 0.119 0.800 0.000 0.000 
DIVEST 
 
1471 0.428 0.495 0.000 1495 0.349 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 
 
1471 7.772 1.675 7.468 1495 7.741 1.359 7.613 0.587 0.209 
TOBINQ 
 
1471 2.130 1.344 1.713 1495 2.908 2.549 2.013 0.000 0.000 
ROA 
 
1471 0.056 0.098 0.059 1495 0.088 0.130 0.088 0.000 0.000 
GROWTH 1471 0.069 0.233 0.090 1495 0.114 0.219 0.112 0.000 0.000 
FCF 
 
1471 0.052 0.088 0.057 1495 0.085 0.102 0.077 0.000 0.000 
LEVERAGE 1471 0.498 0.193 0.500 1495 0.461 0.200 0.474 0.000 0.000 
PRE_RET 1471 0.226 0.574 0.135 1495 0.218 0.585 0.147 0.690 0.901 
CASH_DEAL 1471 0.634 0.482 1.000 1495 0.632 0.482 1.000 0.934 0.934 
STOCK_DEAL 1471 0.111 0.315 0.000 1495 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.001 0.001 
PUBLIC 
 
1471 0.283 0.451 0.000 1495 0.238 0.426 0.000 0.005 0.005 
DOMESTIC 1471 0.236 0.425 0.000 1495 0.228 0.420 0.000 0.615 0.615 
RELATIVE_SIZE 1471 0.061 0.108 0.020 1495 0.05 0.099 0.016 0.004 0.002 
BIDDERS 1471 0.014 0.116 0.000 1495 0.017 0.131 0.000 0.403 0.403 
DIVERSIFYING 1471 0.434 0.496 0.000 1495 0.464 0.499 0.000 0.111 0.110 
E_INDEX 1471 2.262 1.361 2.000 1495 2.21 1.417 2.000 0.305 0.254 
CEO_CHAIR 1471 0.580 0.494 1.000 1495 0.516 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.000 
EQUITY_COMP 1471 0.464 0.287 0.503 1495 0.502 0.305 0.546 0.000 0.000 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 4 shows the Spearman correlations among selected variables of the M&A analyses. 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the Spearman correlations among all variables in the stock market 
reaction model, and Panel B−D of Table 4 display the Spearman correlations between the two 
variables of interests, managerial ability score and ability ranking, and the dependent variables in 
the post-acquisition operating performance model, goodwill impairment, and the possibility of 
divestiture samples, respectively. According to Panel A of Table 4, the 3-day cumulative 
abnormal return is not significantly correlated with managerial ability. Turning to the control 
variables, firms with higher ability CEOs have higher Tobin-Q, better return on assets, more 
growth opportunities, higher free cash flows, and lower leverage ratio. It shows that higher 
ability CEOs are more likely to use stock instead of cash to finance M&A and to acquire private 
targets. Finally, higher ability CEOs are less likely to hold dual positions, and they have a higher 
equity compensation percentage. These findings are generally consistent with those from Table 3. 
While Panel B of Table 4 reveals that managerial ability is negatively correlated with both post-
acquisition change in ROA and operating cash flows, Panel C shows that the likelihood and the 
magnitude of goodwill impairment are both negatively correlated with managerial ability score at 
the 0.05 significance level. Finally, Panel D shows that managerial ability is negatively 
correlated with the possibility of divestiture in the post-acquisition periods.  
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Table 4: Spearman Correlations among Selected Variables of M&A Sample 
 
Panel A: Stock market reaction  
       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 1.000 
      ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 0.963*** 1.000 
     CAR 0.002 0.004 1.000 
    SIZE 0.008 0.003 -0.050***    1.000 
   TOBINQ 0.192*** 0.203*** -0.036** 0.073***      1.000 
  ROA 0.246*** 0.250*** -0.012 0.039** 0.594***   1.000 
 GROWTH 0.123*** 0.115*** -0.007 -0.045** 0.331*** 0.355***     1.000 
FCF 0.211*** 0.230*** 0.001 0.073*** 0.509*** 0.664*** 0.202*** 
LEVERAGE -0.121*** -0.135*** 0.016 0.293*** -0.340*** -0.279*** -0.169*** 
PRE_RET -0.001 -0.002 -0.017 0.023 0.164*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
CASH_DEAL -0.029* -0.022 0.050*** 0.162*** -0.032* 0.026 -0.097*** 
STOCK_DEAL 0.068*** 0.064*** -0.050*** -0.024 0.178*** 0.061*** 0.124*** 
PUBLIC -0.053*** -0.051* -0.086*** 0.128*** 0.053*** 0.035** -0.030* 
DOMESTIC -0.029 -0.034* -0.022 0.096*** -0.007 -0.013 -0.028 
RELATIVE_SIZE -0.034* -0.036** 0.058*** -0.576*** -0.2741*** -0.137*** -0.067*** 
BIDDERS 0.009 0.008 -0.029* -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 0.003 
DIVERSIFYING 0.028 0.034* -0.014 0.143*** 0.024 0.058*** -0.004 
E_INDEX -0.015 -0.004 0.017 -0.082*** -0.286*** -0.168*** -0.176*** 
CEO_CHAIR -0.086*** -0.076*** 0.007 0.083*** -0.100*** -0.035** -0.042** 
EQUITY_COMP 0.092*** 0.092*** -0.032* 0.186*** 0.246*** 0.013 0.072*** 
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
FCF     1.000 
      LEVERAGE -0.263***   1.000 
     PRE_RET 0.060*** -0.006    1.000 
    CASH_DEAL 0.066*** 0.031* -0.078***    1.000 
   STOCK_DEAL -0.005 -0.077*** 0.129*** -0.511***      1.000 
  PUBLIC 0.031* 0.062*** 0.014 -0.037*** 0.117***   1.000 
 DOMESTIC 0.013 0.068*** -0.020 0.096*** -0.119*** -0.023     1.000 
RELATIVE_SIZE -0.157*** -0.080*** -0.017 -0.235*** 0.002 0.076*** -0.141*** 
BIDDERS -0.003 0.023 -0.014 -0.016 0.014 0.209*** 0.049*** 
DIVERSIFYING 0.085*** 0.056*** 0.041** 0.063*** 0.017 0.007 -0.016 
E_INDEX -0.101*** 0.133*** -0.067*** 0.049*** -0.179*** -0.047*** 0.012 
CEO_CHAIR -0.110*** 0.235*** -0.035** 0.001 -0.024 0.068*** 0.033* 
EQUITY_COMP 0.037** -0.178*** 0.006 -0.035** 0.094*** -0.002 -0.006 
        
 
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 RELATIVE_SIZE 1.000 
      BIDDERS    0.098*** 1.000 
     DIVERSIFYING   -0.134*** -0.014   1.000 
    E_INDEX    0.184*** 0.000 -0.057***    1.000 
   CEO_CHAIR   -0.032 0.008 0.053*** -0.015    1.000 
  EQUITY_COMP   -0.168*** -0.014 0.010 -0.077*** -0.167*** 1 
  
Panel B: Post-acquisition operating performance 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
      ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 1.000 
         ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 0.963*** 1.000 
        CHG_ROA -0.155*** -0.146*** 1.000 
       CHG_CF  -0.161*** -0.145*** 0.588*** 1.000 
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Panel C: Goodwill impairment 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
      ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 1.000 
         ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 0.959*** 1.000 
        GOODWILL_DUM -0.075** -0.061* 1.000 
       GOODWILL -0.077** -0.061 0.979*** 1.000 
      Panel D: Divestiture 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) 
       ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 1.000 
         ABILITY_RANKING_AVG 0.963*** 1.000 
        DIVEST -0.088*** -0.099*** 1.000 
       All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 5 presents the multivariate regression results of testing the association between 
managerial ability and M&A quality using the four quality proxies, with Panel A using 
managerial ability score as the independent variable of interest and Panel B using managerial 
ability ranking as the independent variable of interest. For the dependent variables of 3-day 
cumulative stock returns (Column 1), changes in operating performance (Column 2 and 3), and 
the magnitude of goodwill impairment (Column 5), I use OLS regressions. For the dependent 
variables of the likelihood of goodwill impairment and divestiture (Column 4 and 6), I use 
logistic regressions.  
As shown, managerial ability score is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
goodwill impairment (z-statistic = -1.96) and the likelihood of divestiture (z-statistic = -2.34), 
suggesting that the M&A conducted by higher ability CEOs are less likely to experience 
goodwill impairment and divestiture in the post-acquisition period. However, I find that 
managerial ability is negatively associated with the change in operating cash flows (t-statistic = -
1.86), contradicting  the prediction that the M&As conducted by higher ability CEOs lead to 
better post-acquisition operating performance. I do not find significant results when using the 3-
day cumulative abnormal returns, the change in ROA, and the magnitude of goodwill 
impairment as dependent variables. Turning to the control variables, it shows that stock 
payments, public targets, and diversifying M&A are negatively associated with the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal stock return, and cash financed M&A have more positive stock returns. 
These results are consistent with prior literature (e.g., Travlos 1987; Wansley et al. 1987; Morck 
1990; Chang 1998; Fuller et al. 2002; Goodman et al. 2013). 
In sum, in the analysis of managerial ability and M&A quality, I find limited evidence to 
support the prediction that higher ability CEOs conduct higher quality M&A, using the above 
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four quality proxies. Specially, I find that the M&A conducted by higher ability CEOs are less 
likely to have goodwill impairment and divestiture in the post-acquisition period. However, the 
M&A made by higher ability CEOs perform worse in the post-acquisition era using the change 
in operating cash flow as the proxy.
13
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 I also adopt the propensity-score matching methodology to examine the association between managerial ability 
and the quality of M&A. I deploy the following model specification: CAR (CHG_ROA or CHG_CF)= β0 + β1 
ABILITY_AVG + β2 SIZEt-1 + β3 TOBINQt-1 + β4 ROAt-1 + β5 GROWTHt-1 + β6 FCFt-1 + β7 LEVERAGEt-1. The 
treatment variable indicates the treatment effect of M&A, equaling to 1 if it is a M&A firm, and zero otherwise. I 
use propensity-score matching method to construct the control sample. Results (untabulated) from this model 
specification do not provide significant results to support H1.  
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Table 5: The Association between Managerial Ability and M&A Quality 
 
Panel A: Using managerial ability score 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
CAR
14
 CHG_ROA CHG_CF P(GOODWILL_DUM)
15
 GOODWILL P(DIVESTITURE) 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat) 
ABILITY_SCORE_AVG -0.008 -0.011 -0.043* -2.282* -244.484 -1.339** 
 
 
(-1.14) (-0.25) (-1.86) (-1.96) (-1.57) (-2.34) 
 SIZE -0.001 0.006* -0.002 0.102 35.671 0.344*** 
 
 
(-1.43) (1.83) (-0.68) (0.71) (1.61) (5.15) 
 TOBINQ 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.298*** 39.276** 0.066* 
 
 
(1.55) (-0.80) (-1.55) (3.54) (2.56) (1.83) 
 ROA -0.016 -0.313*** -0.062 -2.064 31.462 0.397 
 
 
(-1.12) (-2.87) (-0.75) (-1.41) (0.14) (0.64) 
 GROWTH 0.006 -0.014 0.037** -0.230 78.543 -0.204 
 
 
(1.51) (-0.71) (2.09) (-0.67) (1.16) (-1.13) 
 FCF 0.024 0.008 -0.121* -2.642 -506.297 -1.665*** 
 
 
(1.50) (0.16) (-1.96) (-1.35) (-1.30) (-3.00) 
 LEVERAGE 0.010 0.034* 0.033** -0.144 -136.719 -0.209 
 
 
(1.42) (1.86) (2.01) (-0.20) (-1.65) (-0.66) 
 PRE_RET -0.004 -0.014 0.004 -0.123 -27.976 -0.033 
 
 
(-1.22) (-0.98) (0.71) (-0.76) (-0.62) (-0.42) 
 CASH_DEAL 0.005*** -0.002 -0.005** 0.086 1.279 0.030 
 
 
(2.97) (-0.47) (-2.28) (0.40) (0.11) (0.33) 
 STOCK_DEAL -0.005** -0.016** -0.012 0.049 74.515 -0.047 
 
 
(-2.28) (-2.13) (-1.12) (0.12) (0.84) (-0.26) 
 PUBLIC -0.011*** 0.015*** 0.014*** -0.022 65.287 0.286*** 
                                                           
14
 For Column (1), (2), (3), and (5), I use OLS regressions.  
15
 For Column (4) and (6), I use Logistic regressions. 
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(-5.40) (2.68) (3.17) (-0.10) (0.96) (2.68) 
 DOMESTIC -0.005** -0.001 0.001 0.432** 1.773 0.014 
 
 
(-2.44) (-0.22) (0.32) (2.07) (0.05) (0.12) 
 RELATIVE_SIZE 0.009 -0.037** -0.050*** 2.029*** 85.009 1.113 
 
 
(0.54) (-2.34) (-2.86) (2.61) (1.21) (1.53) 
 BIDDERS -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 -2.080* -152.963* -0.301 
 
 
(-0.57) (-0.77) (-0.40) (-1.80) (-1.75) (-0.93) 
 DIVERSIFYING -0.003* -0.005 -0.002 0.009 -3.741 -1.854*** 
 
 
(-1.92) (-1.21) (-0.48) (0.06) (-0.24) (-15.70) 
 E_INDEX 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.037 1.079 -0.010 
 
 
(0.75) (-0.37) (0.05) (0.28) (0.26) (-0.19) 
 CEO_CHAIR 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.101 52.535 -0.028 
 
 
(1.17) (-0.68) (-1.20) (-0.42) (1.19) (-0.24) 
 EQUITY_COMP -0.000 -0.017*** -0.012 0.083 48.263 0.209 
 
 
(-0.04) (-2.61) (-1.50) (0.13) (0.89) (1.42) 
 INTERCEPT 0.017 0.040 0.043** 13.072*** -275.390 -15.493*** 
 
(1.02) (1.47) (1.97) (10.80) (-1.30) (-12.79) 
 
        YEAR DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 INDUSTRY DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
        N 3226 2898 2898 730 730 2966 
 R2/ Pseudo R2 0.050 0.288 0.219 0.138 0.127 0.176 
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Panel B: Using managerial ability ranking  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
 CAR CHG_ROA CHG_CF P(GOODWILL_DUM) GOODWILL P(DIVESTITURE)  
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient  
 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat) (t-stat) (z-stat)  
ABILITY_RANKING_AVG -0.001 -0.001 -0.017 -1.112* -105.371 -0.964*** 
 
 
(-0.24) (-0.06) (-1.35) (-1.94) (-1.27) (-3.33) 
 CONTROL VARIABLE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
  
YEAR DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 INDUSTRY DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
        N 3226 2898 2898 730 730 3208 
 R2/ Pseudo R2 0.050 0.288 0.217 0.137 0.125 0.179 
 All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Column (1), (2),(3), and (5) are estimated through OLS regression, and Column (4) and (6) are estimated through logistic regression. 
t-Statistics or z-Statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and time-series 
correlation using a two-way cluster at the firm and year level. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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5.2 Managerial Ability and Capital Investment  
 In this analysis, I keep observations with non-missing values in the variables as specified 
in the Model (4) and Model (5). The final sample in this set of analyses is 40,067 firm-year 
observations. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of their distributions to 
minimize the effect of outliers.
16
  
In Table 6, I present the distribution of the capital investment sample by the two-digit 
SIC industry code. The industry with highest frequency in the capital investment sample is 
Business Services (17.68 percent, SIC code 73), followed Chemicals and Allied Products (15.86 
percent, SIC code 28), and Instruments and Related Products (13.11 percent, SIC code 38). 
 
Table 6: Distribution of Firm-Year Observations by Industry of Capital Investment Sample 
 
  Two-digit SIC # of Obs. 
 
% of Sample 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Oil and Gas 13 
 
183 
 
0.46 0.46 
Food, Beverage 20 
 
547 
 
1.37 1.82 
Paper and Allied Products 26 
 
237 
 
0.59 2.41 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 
 
6356 
 
15.86 18.28 
Rubber 30 
 
386 
 
0.96 19.24 
Primary Metal Industries 33 
 
382 
 
0.95 20.19 
Fabricated Metal Products 34 
 
613 
 
1.53 21.72 
Industrial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35 
 
4177 
 
10.43 32.15 
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 36 
 
5891 
 
14.7 46.85 
Transportation Equipment 37 
 
1062 
 
2.65 49.5 
Instruments and Related Products 38 
 
5252 
 
13.11 62.61 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 39 
 
485 
 
1.21 63.82 
Communication 48 
 
752 
 
1.88 65.7 
Wholesale—Durable Goods 50 
 
964 
 
2.41 68.1 
Wholesale—Non-Durable Goods 51 
 
357 
 
0.89 68.99 
General Merchandise Store 53 
 
389 
 
0.97 69.97 
Food Stores 54 
 
205 
 
0.51 70.48 
                                                          
16
 I also conduct the regressions with the non-winsorized data. I find that managerial ability is positively associated 
with total capital vestment and R&D, but not with capital expenditure and acquisition expenditure. Regarding the 
association analyses conditioning on firms’ tendency towards over- and under-investment, the results using the 
actual investment levels are qualitatively consistent with those reported in Table 9, except no association found 
between managerial ability and capital expenditure; however, the results using abnormal levels become weaker. 
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Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 
 
762 
 
1.9 72.38 
Furniture & Home furnishings Stores 57 
 
184 
 
0.46 72.84 
Eating and Drinking 58 
 
937 
 
2.34 75.18 
Miscellaneous Retail 59 
 
907 
 
2.26 77.44 
Business Services 73 
 
7085 
 
17.68 95.12 
Amusement and Recreation Services 79 
 
234 
 
0.58 95.71 
Health Services 80 
 
718 
 
1.79 97.5 
Engineering and Management Services 87 
 
543 
 
1.36 98.85 
Nonclassifiable Establishments 99 
 
459 
 
1.15 100.00 
   
40,067 
 
100.00 
  
Table 7 displays the descriptive statistics of the full sample, the descriptive statistics and 
difference tests by low versus high ability groups, and the Spearman correlations among selected 
variables. In Panel A of Table 7, the mean (median) of total capital investments of is 0.217 
(0.141) of previous year’s total assets. Regarding the components of total capital investments, the 
mean (median) of capital expenditure is 0.428 (0.250) of previous year’s PPE, the mean (median) 
of R&D is 0.131 (0.066) of previous year’s total assets, and the mean of acquisition expenditures 
is 0.028 of prior year’s total assets. A median of zero for acquisition expenditures indicates that 
less than 50 percent of the firm-year observations have acquisitions during the sample period 
from 1993 to 2011. The managerial ability score has a mean (median) of -0.011 (-0.021), and the 
managerial ability ranking has a mean (median) of 0.545 (0.500). Panel B of Table 7 reports the 
descriptive statistics by low versus high managerial ability, using the industry median of the 
managerial ability score as a benchmark. It shows that the high ability group has a higher capital 
expenditures level and a higher acquisition expenditures level but a lower total capital 
investments and R&D level compared to the low ability group. The comparison statistics also 
show that the high ability group generally has lower abnormal investment levels compared to the 
low ability group. Panel C of Table 7 presents the Spearman correlations among selected 
variables. While R&D is negatively correlated with managerial ability, capital expenditures and 
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acquisition expenditures are shown to be positively correlated with the two ability variables. The 
managerial ability ranking is positively related to the total capital investment level. Turning to 
the abnormal investment levels, the abnormal levels of capital expenditures, R&D, and total 
capital investments are positively correlated with managerial ability. However, Panel B and 
Panel C should be interpreted with caution because they are univariate results.  
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Capital Investment Sample 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
  
N Mean Sd. 25 percentile Median 75 percentile 
INVT_TOT 40067 0.217 0.260 0.071 0.141 0.259 
CAPX 
 
40067 0.428 0.576 0.129 0.250 0.488 
R&D  
 
40067 0.131 0.206 0.013 0.066 0.160 
ACQ 
 
40067 0.028 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.004 
AB_TOT 
 
40067 -0.115 0.488 -0.180 -0.078 0.013 
AB_CAPX 40067 -0.218 1.658 -0.379 -0.179 0.019 
AB_R&D 40067 -0.082 0.391 -0.118 -0.039 0.001 
AB_ACQ 40067 -0.014 0.153 -0.046 -0.027 -0.013 
ABILITY_SCORE 40067 -0.011 0.152 -0.107 -0.021 0.070 
ABILITY_RANKING 40067 0.545 0.282 0.300 0.500 0.800 
OVERI 
 
40067 0.550 0.247 0.350 0.550 0.750 
SIZE 
 
40067 4.585 2.263 3.045 4.473 5.998 
MTOB 
 
40067 3.042 4.053 1.229 1.839 3.154 
LOSS 
 
40067 0.459 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SALE_VOL 40067 0.253 0.261 0.092 0.171 0.314 
INVT_VOL 40067 0.102 0.138 0.026 0.057 0.122 
CFO_SALE 40067 -1.293 7.271 -0.129 0.038 0.114 
CFO_VOL 40067 0.155 0.248 0.044 0.082 0.161 
SLACK 
 
40067 6.452 16.747 0.268 1.320 5.463 
DIV 
 
40067 0.232 0.422 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ZSCORE 40067 1.103 0.774 0.597 0.970 1.439 
TANGIBILITY 40067 0.192 0.174 0.062 0.137 0.266 
KSTRUCTURE  40067 0.109 0.177 0.000 0.016 0.148 
IND_KSTRUCTURE 40067 0.109 0.083 0.055 0.079 0.137 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables by Low versus High Ability  
      
  
Low Ability 
 
High Ability Difference Tests 
    N Mean SD Median 
 
N Mean SD Median t-test wilcoxon 
           
(p values) (p values) 
ABILITY_SCORE 20029 -0.125 -0.107 0.083 
 
20038 0.103 0.070 0.115 0.000 0.000 
ABILITY_RANKING 20029 0.309 0.300 0.152 
 
20038 0.782 0.800 0.156 0.000 0.000 
INVT_TOT 20029 0.221 0.144 0.260 
 
20038 0.213 0.138 0.259 0.001 0.000 
CAPX 
 
20029 0.378 0.214 0.543 
 
20038 0.477 0.288 0.604 0.000 0.000 
R&D  
 
20029 0.145 0.077 0.211 
 
20038 0.118 0.053 0.199 0.000 0.000 
ACQ 
 
20029 0.024 0.000 0.084 
 
20038 0.032 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.000 
AB_TOT 
 
20029 -0.126 -0.088 0.498 
 
20038 -0.105 -0.069 0.478 0.000 0.000 
AB_CAPX 
 
20029 -0.253 -0.219 1.451 
 
20038 -0.182 -0.135 1.841 0.000 0.000 
AB_R&D 
 
20029 -0.083 -0.046 0.402 
 
20038 -0.080 -0.032 0.380 0.471 0.000 
AB_ACQ 
 
20029 -0.018 -0.027 0.158 
 
20038 -0.010 -0.026 0.148 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Panel C: Spearman Correlations among Selected Variables 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ABILITY_SCORE 1.000 
         ABILITY_RANKING 0.962*** 1.000 
        INVT_TOT 0.002 0.026*** 1.000 
       CAPX 
 
0.185*** 0.180*** 0.413*** 1.000 
      R&D  
 
-0.096*** -0.049*** 0.720*** 0.190*** 1.000 
     ACQ 
 
0.084*** 0.069*** 0.195*** 0.111*** -0.105*** 1.000 
    AB_TOT 
 
0.050*** 0.039*** 0.548*** 0.217*** 0.232*** 0.154*** 1.000 
   AB_CAPX 
 
0.146*** 0.128*** 0.175*** 0.640*** -0.027*** 0.051*** 0.382*** 1.000 
  AB_R&D 
 
0.014*** 0.001 0.380*** 0.088*** 0.340*** -0.106*** 0.786*** 0.248*** 1.000 
 AB_ACQ 
 
0.033*** 0.047*** 0.127*** -0.055*** -0.107*** 0.498*** 0.313*** 0.160*** 0.0041 1.000 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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I first run multivariate regressions to investigate the association between managerial 
ability and actual investments and the association between managerial ability and abnormal 
investments without conditioning on firms’ tendency towards over- or under-investment (Model 
4). The results are tabulated in Table 8. Both the managerial ability score (Panel A of Table 8) 
and the ranking (Panel B of Table 8) are positively associated with total capital investments and 
the three components of total capital investments (capital expenditures, R&D, and acquisition 
expenditures). The t-statistics range from 2.64 (2.83) for the acquisition expenditures to 5.41 
(6.19) for the total capital investments when using the managerial ability score (managerial 
ability ranking). Meanwhile, the multivariate regressions of abnormal investments on managerial 
ability reveal that managerial ability is positively associated with abnormal total capital 
investments, abnormal capital expenditures, and abnormal R&D.
17
 
                                                          
17
 Managerial ability ranking, but not managerial ability score, is positively associated with abnormal acquisition 
expenditure.  
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 Table 8: The Unconditional Association between Managerial Ability and Capital Investment Levels/Abnormal Capital 
Investment Levels (N =40,067) 
Panel A: using managerial ability score 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
INVT_TOT CAPX R&D  ACQ AB_TOT AB_CAPX AB_R&D AB_ACQ 
 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
ABILITY_SCORE 0.099*** 0.192*** 0.063*** 0.008*** 0.080*** 0.137* 0.049** 0.008 
 
(5.41) (3.07) (4.52) (2.64) (2.72) (1.88) (2.39) (1.53) 
SIZE -0.008*** 0.013** -0.012*** 0.002*** -0.008*** 0.010*** -0.010*** 0.001 
 
(-4.82) (2.22) (-7.64) (7.05) (-2.96) (3.26) (-6.31) (1.51) 
MTOB 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 0.000 
 
(10.35) (4.31) (8.25) (5.60) (7.22) (4.30) (7.45) (0.66) 
LOSS 0.009** -0.069*** 0.039*** -0.020*** 0.017** -0.045*** 0.048*** -0.021*** 
 
(2.33) (-4.69) (15.41) (-12.56) (2.23) (-2.75) (7.76) (-10.39) 
SALE_VOL -0.023*** 0.116*** -0.034*** 0.001 -0.018** 0.096** -0.028*** 0.003 
 
(-2.76) (5.30) (-4.81) (0.44) (-1.96) (1.97) (-3.02) (0.50) 
INVT_VOL 0.338*** 1.403*** 0.577*** 0.150*** 0.313*** 1.556*** 0.547*** 0.146*** 
 
(8.78) (6.96) (11.60) (7.50) (8.11) (3.61) (9.93) (8.42) 
CFO_SALE -0.003*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 
 
(-5.74) (0.91) (-4.71) (0.27) (-3.00) (0.22) (-3.66) (0.22) 
CFO_VOL 0.010 -0.038 -0.065*** -0.003 0.032 -0.015 -0.051** -0.000 
 
(0.71) (-1.28) (-4.43) (-1.11) (1.40) (-0.47) (-2.47) (-0.08) 
SLACK -0.001*** 0.008*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.008*** -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-3.21) (5.86) (-3.17) (-0.65) (-0.99) (5.52) (-1.64) (-1.37) 
DIV -0.012*** -0.059*** -0.007*** 0.000 -0.009** -0.090*** -0.004 0.002 
 
(-2.97) (-7.65) (-2.60) (0.22) (-2.36) (-3.83) (-1.53) (1.03) 
ZSCORE -0.013*** 0.007 -0.007** -0.003*** -0.012** 0.006 -0.007** -0.001 
 
(-3.03) (0.61) (-2.12) (-3.40) (-2.41) (0.52) (-1.99) (-0.67) 
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TANGIBILITY 0.085*** -0.774*** -0.016 -0.018*** 0.129*** -0.720*** 0.022 -0.025*** 
 
(4.99) (-12.01) (-1.50) (-5.03) (3.88) (-14.15) (1.00) (-3.31) 
KSTRUCTURE  -0.116*** -0.197*** -0.032*** -0.020*** -0.119*** -0.235*** -0.042*** -0.019 
 
(-9.74) (-7.01) (-4.51) (-6.50) (-10.55) (-7.65) (-6.33) . 
IND_KSTRUCTURE -0.130*** -0.057 -0.097*** 0.006 -0.256 0.634 -0.276** 0.071* 
 
(-3.40) (-0.93) (-3.65) (0.62) (-1.61) (1.55) (-2.11) (1.92) 
INTERCEPT 0.093*** 0.545*** 0.022 0.023*** -0.034 -0.419*** 0.030 -0.021 
 
(2.90) (4.75) (0.89) (2.98) (-1.05) (-2.87) (0.80) (-1.48) 
         INDUSTRY DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
YEAR DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
         Adj. R
2 
0.307 0.223 0.484 0.050 0.232 0.087 0.264 0.056 
         Panel B: using managerial ability ranking 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
INVT_TOT CAPX R&D  ACQ AB_TOT AB_CAPX AB_R&D AB_ACQ 
 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
ABILITY_RANKING 0.051*** 0.106*** 0.030*** 0.005*** 0.049*** 0.078*** 0.031*** 0.004** 
 
(6.19) (3.66) (4.97) (2.83) (4.77) (3.84) (4.13) (2.02) 
         CONTROL VARIABLES Included 0.446*** 0.009 0.027*** -0.163*** -0.618*** -0.052 -0.034** 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
YEAR DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
         Adj. R
2 
0.307 0.223 0.483 0.050 0.232 0.087 0.264 0.056 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
t-statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a 
two-way cluster at the firm and year level. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Next, I conduct tests to investigate the association between capital investment and 
managerial ability conditioned on firms’ tendency towards over- or under-investment (Model 5). 
The results are reported in Table 9. As shown in Columns 1−4, I find evidence that both 
managerial ability score and ability ranking are positively associated with R&D, acquisition 
expenditures, and total capital investment when firms are most likely to under-invest. Using total 
investments as an example, one standard deviation increase in the managerial ability score results 
in an increase of 0.032 in total capital investments among firms that are likely to under-invest. 
Considering the mean value of total capital investments (deflated by previous year’s total assets) 
is 0.217, this reflects an increase of 14.8 percent. However, I do not find the same effect on 
capital expenditures when firms are predicted to likely under-invest. Further, the results show 
that as the likelihood of over-investment increases, higher ability CEOs tend to reduce total 
capital investments and acquisition expenditures, indicated by the negative and significant 
coefficient of the interaction between managerial ability and over-investment likelihood (OVERI). 
However, I find an opposite result for capital expenditures. The result of the capital expenditures 
variable suggests that when firms are more likely to over-invest, higher ability CEOs tend to 
increase their capital expenditures level.  
Overall, the results indicate that when firms have a predisposition towards under-
investment, higher ability CEOs are shown to increase the levels of R&D, acquisition 
expenditures, and total capital investments, but not the level of capital expenditures; when firms 
have an increasing likelihood of over-investment, managerial ability tend to decrease the levels 
of acquisition expenditures and total capital investments but to increase the level of capital 
expenditures. 
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Turning to the control variables, the estimated coefficients are consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009). For example, growing firms (MTOB) 
are more likely to increase investment levels; distributing dividends (DIV) negatively affects the 
investment level of the next period; and the likelihood of bankruptcy (ZSCORE) and a capital 
structure with higher ratio of leverage (KSTRUCTURE) are negatively associated with 
investment levels.  
 I also test the association between managerial ability and the abnormal investment levels 
conditional on firms’ tendency to over-invest and under-invest. Columns 5−8 of Table 9 display 
the results. Generally speaking, the results of abnormal investment levels are consistent with 
those reported in Columns 1−4 of Table 9. Specifically, when firms are most likely to under-
invest, the abnormal R&D, abnormal acquisition expenditures, and abnormal total capital 
investments is increasing with managerial ability, respectively. Managerial ability tends to 
decrease the abnormal levels of total capital investments, R&D, and acquisition expenditures as 
firms’ likelihood of over-investment is increasing.  
Together, the earlier association tests without conditioning on firms’ tendency towards 
over- or under-investment show that, generally, higher ability CEOs make higher levels of 
capital investment. They are also associated with higher abnormal capital investment level. More 
importantly, the conditional association tests reveal that when firms are very likely to under-
invest, higher ability CEOs have a tendency to increase R&D, acquisition expenditures, and total 
capital investments. CEOs also tend to increase abnormal R&D, abnormal acquisition 
expenditures, and abnormal total capital investments when firms have a higher likelihood of 
under-investing. When firms’ likelihood of over-investing is increasing, higher ability CEOs 
decrease acquisition expenditures and total capital investments. Higher ability CEOs are also 
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shown to decrease abnormal R&D, abnormal acquisition expenditures, and abnormal total capital 
investments when firms’ likelihood of over-investing is high. However, the results show that 
higher ability CEOs increase capital expenditures even when firms have the tendency to over-
invest. The above results provide evidence to the prediction that managerial ability can improve 
capital investment efficiency and alleviate the agency problems.  
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 Table 9: The Conditional Association between Managerial Ability and Capital Investment Levels/Abnormal Capital 
Investment Levels  
(N = 40,067) 
 
 
Panel A: using managerial ability score 
     
 
INVT_TOT CAPX R&D  ACQ AB_TOT AB_CAPX AB_R&D AB_ACQ 
 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
ABILITY_SCORE 0.208*** -0.048 0.091*** 0.042*** 0.250*** -0.205 0.125*** 0.043*** 
 
(5.45) (-0.65) (3.70) (5.11) (6.07) (-1.57) (3.89) (3.85) 
OVERI 0.024 0.267*** 0.040*** -0.041*** 0.034** 0.300*** 0.054*** -0.040*** 
 
(1.60) (6.92) (4.31) (-8.08) (2.00) (7.19) (4.10) (-8.76) 
OVERI_ABILITY -0.182*** 0.402** -0.046 -0.057*** -0.285*** 0.574*** -0.127* -0.057*** 
 
(-3.68) (2.26) (-1.34) (-5.02) (-3.22) (2.68) (-1.74) (-2.86) 
SIZE -0.009*** 0.012** -0.012*** 0.002*** -0.008*** 0.009*** -0.011*** 0.001* 
 
(-4.82) (2.21) (-7.55) (7.60) (-3.05) (3.52) (-6.33) (1.71) 
MTOB 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.015*** 0.001*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.000 
 
(10.18) (4.48) (8.05) (5.20) (7.09) (4.50) (7.21) (0.74) 
LOSS 0.010** -0.056*** 0.040*** -0.022*** 0.017** -0.030* 0.050*** -0.023*** 
 
(2.37) (-3.86) (16.32) (-12.08) (2.29) (-1.96) (7.91) (-10.65) 
SALE_VOL -0.023*** 0.116*** -0.035*** 0.002 -0.018* 0.095* -0.028*** 0.004 
 
(-2.75) (5.21) (-4.93) (0.86) (-1.95) (1.94) (-3.11) (0.68) 
INVT_VOL 0.337*** 1.234*** 0.573*** 0.134*** 0.310*** 1.364*** 0.541*** 0.131*** 
 
(8.71) (6.52) (11.40) (7.26) (7.91) (3.17) (9.63) (8.17) 
CFO_SALE -0.003*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000 
 
(-5.65) (0.71) (-4.64) (0.76) (-2.82) (0.01) (-3.51) (0.79) 
CFO_VOL 0.012 -0.010 -0.061*** -0.007** 0.035 0.017 -0.046** -0.004 
 
(0.82) (-0.35) (-4.04) (-2.34) (1.48) (0.55) (-2.16) (-0.86) 
SLACK -0.001*** 0.007*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.007*** -0.001* -0.000 
 
(-3.10) (5.86) (-3.31) (1.49) (-1.06) (5.38) (-1.92) (-0.50) 
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DIV -0.011*** -0.043*** -0.005* -0.002 -0.007* -0.072*** -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-2.60) (-5.19) (-1.74) (-1.51) (-1.70) (-2.97) (-0.15) (-0.09) 
ZSCORE -0.013*** 0.022* -0.005 -0.005*** -0.012** 0.023** -0.005 -0.004** 
 
(-2.86) (1.92) (-1.58) (-4.92) (-2.39) (2.06) (-1.34) (-2.22) 
TANGIBILITY 0.094*** -0.716*** -0.008 -0.025*** 0.142*** -0.659*** 0.035 -0.031*** 
 
(5.09) (-12.87) (-0.73) (-5.92) (3.94) (-16.57) (1.43) (-4.37) 
KSTRUCTURE  -0.098*** -0.047 -0.007 -0.042*** -0.093*** -0.070 -0.007 -0.041*** 
 
(-7.77) (-1.52) (-0.93) (-8.44) (-7.33) (-1.59) (-0.81) (-16.09) 
IND_KSTRUCTURE -0.124*** -0.033 -0.091*** 0.002 -0.247 0.659 -0.268** 0.067* 
 
(-3.31) (-0.59) (-3.57) (0.22) (-1.57) (1.61) (-2.08) (1.82) 
INTERCEPT 0.074** 0.368*** -0.007 0.051*** -0.060* -0.617*** -0.009 0.006 
 
(2.43) (2.94) (-0.29) (6.79) (-1.85) (-4.26) (-0.24) (0.45) 
         INDUSTRY DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
YEAR DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
         Adj. R
2 
0.308 0.231 0.485 0.058 0.232 0.088 0.265 0.058 
         Panel B: using managerial ability ranking 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
INVT_TOT CAPX R&D  ACQ AB_TOT AB_CAPX AB_R&D AB_ACQ 
 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
ABILITY_RANKING 0.097*** -0.013 0.039*** 0.021*** 0.120*** -0.088*** 0.060*** 0.015*** 
 
(6.09) (-0.41) (3.90) (4.60) (4.83) (-3.20) (2.92) (3.85) 
OVERI 0.071*** 0.146* 0.049*** -0.025*** 0.107*** 0.131* 0.083*** -0.029*** 
 
(3.65) (1.88) (3.89) (-4.91) (3.42) (1.82) (2.95) (-6.26) 
OVERI_ABILITY -0.081*** 0.215*** -0.014 -0.028*** -0.125** 0.297*** -0.050 -0.019*** 
 
(-3.53) (2.59) (-0.87) (-4.58) (-2.55) (3.42) (-1.20) (-3.68) 
         CONTROL VARIABLES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 79 
 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
YEAR DUMMIES Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
         Adj. R
2 
0.308 0.231 0.485 0.058 0.232 0.088 0.265 0.058 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
t-statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a 
two-way cluster at the firm and year level. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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5.3 Managerial Ability and the Value of Cash 
In the examination of the association of managerial ability and the value of cash, both 
financial services industries (with SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and utility industries (with 
SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) are excluded from the analyses, because the liquidity of the 
firms in the financial industries is hard to assess and the utility sector complies with a special 
regulatory system (e.g., Dittmar and Smith 2007; Liu and Mauer 2011). The final sample 
consists of 58,336 firm-year observations. All data are adjusted to real value in 2011 dollars 
using the consumer price index (CPI), and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% of their distributions to minimize the effect of outliers.  
Table 10 displays the distribution of the value of cash sample by the two-digit SIC 
industry code. The industry with the highest frequency is Business Services (10.95 percent, SIC 
code 73), followed Chemicals and Allied Products (9.95 percent, SIC code 28), and Electronic 
and Other Electric Equipment (9.33 percent, SIC code 36). 
 
Table 10: Distribution of Firm-Year Observations by Industry of The Value of Cash Sample 
 
  
Two-digit 
SIC 
# of 
Obs.   
% of 
Sample 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Metal Mining, Ores 10 
 
775 
 
1.33 1.33 
Oil and Gas 13 
 
2626 
 
4.50 5.83 
General Building Contractors 15 
 
403 
 
0.69 6.52 
Heavy Construction, Except Building 16 
 
287 
 
0.49 7.01 
Food, Beverage 20 
 
1,647 
 
2.82 9.83 
Textile Mill Products 22 
 
368 
 
0.63 10.46 
Apparel and Other Textile Products 23 
 
650 
 
1.11 11.57 
Lumber and Wood Products 24 
 
377 
 
0.65 12.22 
Furniture and Fixtures 25 
 
474 
 
0.81 13.03 
Paper and Allied Products 26 
 
794 
 
1.36 14.39 
Printing and Publishing 27 
 
830 
 
1.42 15.81 
Chemicals and Allied Products 28 
 
5,802 
 
9.95 25.76 
Petroleum 29 
 
593 
 
1.02 26.78 
Rubber 30 
 
769 
 
1.32 28.10 
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Leather & Leather Products 31 
 
234 
 
0.40 28.50 
Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 32 
 
427 
 
0.73 29.23 
Primary Metal Industries 33 
 
1,036 
 
1.78 31.01 
Fabricated Metal Products 34 
 
978 
 
1.68 32.69 
Industrial Machinery and Computer Equipment 35 
 
4,278 
 
7.33 40.02 
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment 36 
 
5,444 
 
9.33 49.35 
Transportation Equipment 37 
 
1,579 
 
2.71 52.06 
Instruments and Related Products 38 
 
4,262 
 
7.31 59.37 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 39 
 
671 
 
1.15 60.52 
Railroad Transportation 40 
 
211 
 
0.36 60.88 
Trucking & Warehousing 42 
 
541 
 
0.93 61.81 
Water Transportation 44 
 
439 
 
0.75 62.56 
Air Transportation 45 
 
470 
 
0.81 63.37 
Communication 48 
 
2,317 
 
3.97 67.34 
Wholesale—Durable Goods 50 
 
1,637 
 
2.81 70.15 
Wholesale—Non-Durable Goods 51 
 
884 
 
1.52 71.67 
Building Materials & Gardening Supplies 52 
 
148 
 
0.25 71.92 
General Merchandise Store 53 
 
468 
 
0.80 72.72 
Food Stores 54 
 
436 
 
0.75 73.47 
Auto Dealers, Gas Stations 55 
 
333 
 
0.57 74.04 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 56 
 
606 
 
1.04 75.08 
Furniture & Home furnishings Stores 57 
 
321 
 
0.55 75.63 
Eating and Drinking 58 
 
1,030 
 
1.77 77.40 
Miscellaneous Retail 59 
 
1,204 
 
2.06 79.46 
Hotels & Other Lodging Places 70 
 
226 
 
0.39 79.85 
Personal Services 72 
 
224 
 
0.38 80.23 
Business Services 73 
 
6,387 
 
10.95 91.18 
Motion Pictures 78 
 
351 
 
0.60 91.78 
Amusement and Recreation Services 79 
 
644 
 
1.10 92.88 
Health Services 80 
 
1,256 
 
2.15 95.03 
Educational Services 82 
 
257 
 
0.44 95.47 
Social Services 83 
 
121 
 
0.21 95.68 
Engineering and Management Services 87 
 
1,090 
 
1.87 97.55 
Nonclassifiable Establishments 99 
 
270 
 
0.46 98.01 
Other Industries
18
 
 
1,161 
 
1.99 100.00 
   
58,336 
 
100.00 
  
 
 
                                                          
18
 Industries whose observations are less than 200 are aggregate into this category. 
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 In Table 11, I present the descriptive statistics of the full sample, the descriptive statistics 
and difference tests of low versus high ability groups, and the Spearman correlation matrix of the 
selected variables in the analysis of managerial ability and the value of cash.  
In Panel A of Table 11, The managerial ability score has an average (median) of -0.010  
(-0.018) and the variable of managerial ability ranking has an average of 0.545 (0.500). The 
mean of the excess stock return is positive (0.034) while the median is negative (-0.076), 
indicating the skewness of the excess stock return distribution. Turning to the financial 
characteristics, the sample firms have positive yearly changes in cash balance, earnings, and net 
assets. The mean leverage is 0.228 and the average of cash (deflated by the lagged market value 
of the equity) is 0.172. 
 Panel B of Table 11 displays descriptive statistics by low versus high managerial ability, 
using the industry median of the managerial ability score as a benchmark. As it shows, 
managerial ability score and ranking are significantly higher in the high ability group. 
Specifically, the mean value of the managerial ability score (ranking) for the high ability group is 
0.096 (0.773), while it is -0.117 (0.318) in the low ability group. The excess stock return is 
significantly higher in the high ability group (with a mean value of 0.083 and a median of -0.030) 
compared to that in the low ability group (with a mean value of -0.015 and -0.126). Firms in the 
high ability group significantly outperform those in the low ability group in the yearly changes of 
cash, earnings, net assets, and R&D. Finally, firms in the high ability group have lower cash 
levels, leverage, and net finance figures.  
 The Spearman correlation matrix in Panel C of Table 11 shows that managerial ability 
(both managerial ability score and ranking) is positively correlated with excess annual stock 
returns, change in cash, change in earnings, change in net assets, change in R&D, change in 
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interest, and change in dividend payout. Meanwhile, managerial ability is negatively correlated 
with cash level, leverage, and net finance. 
 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of the Value of Cash Sample 
 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
      Variable 
 
N Mean Sd. 25 Percentile Median 75 Percentile 
ABILITY_SCORE 58336 -0.010 0.140 -0.099 -0.018 0.070 
ABILITY_RANKING 58336 0.545 0.275 0.300 0.500 0.800 
EX_RET 
 
58336 0.034 0.659 -0.345 -0.076 0.233 
∆C  
 
58336 0.008 0.137 -0.029 0.001 0.036 
∆E 
 
58336 0.027 0.262 -0.031 0.007 0.046 
∆NA  
 
58336 0.018 0.449 -0.067 0.017 0.118 
∆RD  
 
58336 -0.001 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.001 
∆I  
 
58336 0.001 0.024 -0.003 0.000 0.003 
∆D 
 
58336 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
C 
 
58336 0.172 0.236 0.030 0.088 0.213 
L 
 
58336 0.228 0.232 0.026 0.160 0.360 
NF 
 
58336 0.038 0.232 -0.034 0.001 0.060 
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Panel B: By Low versus High Managerial Ability 
       
 Low Ability 
 
High Ability Difference Tests 
 
N Mean Median Sd. 
 
N Mean Median Sd. t-test Wilconxon-test 
          (p value)  (p value) 
ABILITY_SCORE 29165 -0.117 -0.099 0.080 
 
29171 0.096 0.070 0.099 0.000 0.000 
ABILITY_RANKING 29165 0.318 0.300 0.152 
 
29171 0.773 0.800 0.156 0.000 0.000 
EX_RET 29165 -0.015 -0.126 0.671 
 
29171 0.083 -0.030 0.643 0.000 0.000 
∆C  29165 0.005 0.000 0.151 
 
29171 0.011 0.002 0.121 0.000 0.000 
∆E 29165 0.021 0.003 0.295 
 
29171 0.033 0.009 0.224 0.000 0.000 
∆NA  29165 -0.039 -0.002 0.472 
 
29171 0.076 0.036 0.418 0.000 0.000 
∆RD  29165 -0.003 0.000 0.026 
 
29171 0.001 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 
∆I  29165 0.000 0.000 0.027 
 
29171 0.001 0.000 0.022 0.302 0.000 
∆D 29165 0.000 0.000 0.008 
 
29171 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 
C 29165 0.195 0.103 0.257 
 
29171 0.149 0.077 0.210 0.000 0.000 
L 29165 0.253 0.186 0.247 
 
29171 0.203 0.137 0.214 0.000 0.000 
NF 29165 0.043 0.001 0.247 
 
29171 0.033 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel C: Spearman correlations 
   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ABILITY_SCORE 1.000 
     ABILITY_RANKING 0.952*** 1.000 
    EX_RET 0.127*** 0.125*** 1.000 
   ∆C  0.041*** 0.038*** 0.221*** 1.000 
  ∆E 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.313*** 0.143*** 1.000 
∆NA  0.217*** 0.199*** 0.181*** -0.044*** 0.137*** 1.000 
∆RD  0.108*** 0.100*** 0.043*** 0.036*** -0.097*** 0.182*** 
∆I  0.038*** 0.027*** -0.089*** -0.022*** -0.002 0.299*** 
∆D 0.098*** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.032*** 0.045*** 0.136*** 
C -0.111*** -0.096*** 0.041*** -0.229*** 0.030*** -0.084*** 
 85 
 
L -0.107*** -0.129*** -0.204*** -0.057*** -0.048*** -0.040*** 
NF -0.027*** -0.022*** 0.001 0.150*** -0.009* 0.418*** 
 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
∆RD  1.000 
     ∆I  0.052*** 1.000 
    ∆D 0.058*** 0.015*** 1.000 
   C -0.021*** -0.088*** -0.067*** 1.000 
  L -0.106*** 0.129*** -0.077*** -0.156*** 1.000  
NF 0.064*** 0.343*** 0.026*** -0.058*** 0.007 1.000 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 12 presents the results of multivariate regression analyses of managerial ability and 
the value of cash (Model 7). I first estimate the original model proposed by Faulkender and 
Wang (2006), with the results tabulated in Column 1 of Table 12. The results are consistent with 
prior literature (e.g., Faulkender and Wang 2006; Dittmar and Smith 2007; Liu and Mauer 2011). 
According to the estimation of the original model, the coefficient estimate corresponding to the 
change in cash balance indicates that shareholders value one marginal dollar of cash at $2.187. In 
addition, as the level of cash increases, the value of cash to shareholders decreases, indicated by 
the significantly negative coefficient estimate of the interaction between change in cash and the 
level of cash (t-statistic = -8.29). Leverage also has a negative impact on the value of cash, 
reflected in the significantly negative coefficient estimate of the interaction between change in 
cash and leverage (t-statistic = -8.72). As well, the change in earnings, net assets, and dividends 
are shown to positively affect the excess stock return while change in interest is negatively 
associated with excess stock return. To estimate the incremental effect of managerial ability on 
the value of cash, I add the two managerial ability variables and their interaction with the change 
in cash (∆C_ABILITY) to the original model. The results are tabulated in Columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 8. The value of cash attached by shareholders is positively and marginally significantly 
related to managerial ability score (with a coefficient of 0.404 and t-statistic = 1.83) and 
positively and significantly associated with managerial ability ranking (with a coefficient of 
0.404 and t-statistic = 3.85). The coefficients and significance of other variables in these two 
multivariate regressions are consistent with those in the original model.  
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Table 12: The Association between Managerial Ability and the Value of Cash 
(N = 58,336) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
EX_RET EX_RET EX_RET 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
∆C  2.187*** 2.194*** 1.986*** 
 
(15.84) (15.45) (14.33) 
ABILITY_SCORE  0.202***  
  (4.62)  
∆C_ABILITY_SCORE  0.488*  
  (1.83)  
ABILITY_RANKING   0.109*** 
   (5.03) 
∆C_ABILITY_RANKING   0.404*** 
   (3.85) 
∆E 0.504*** 0.498*** 0.498*** 
 
(10.76) (10.65) (10.62) 
∆NA  0.207*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 
 
(7.32) (7.17) (7.04) 
∆RD  0.608* 0.516 0.517 
 
(1.75) (1.52) (1.50) 
∆I  -1.844*** -1.836*** -1.831*** 
 
(-6.76) (-6.83) (-6.82) 
∆D 1.788** 1.657** 1.667** 
 
(2.26) (2.07) (2.08) 
C 0.455*** 0.464*** 0.465*** 
 
(5.20) (5.36) (5.36) 
L -0.505*** -0.493*** -0.490*** 
 
(-7.20) (-6.85) (-6.78) 
NF 0.006 0.020 0.020 
 
(0.12) (0.43) (0.43) 
∆C_C -1.054*** -1.039*** -1.024*** 
 
(-8.29) (-8.25) (-7.97) 
∆C_L -2.081*** -2.069*** -2.065*** 
 
(-8.72) (-8.66) (-8.67) 
INTERCEPT 0.031** 0.028** -0.035 
 
(2.22) (2.01) (-1.51) 
    
R
2 
0.217 0.219 0.219 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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t-statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-
sectional and time-series correlation using a two-way cluster at the firm and year level. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1&, respectively. 
 
Next, I investigate the pattern of the association between the value of cash and 
managerial ability in the financially constrained and financially unconstrained context. Results 
are tabulated in Table 13.  
Consistent with prior literature on the value of cash, shareholders attach higher value to 
the cash of financially constrained firms, suggested by the larger size of the coefficient estimates 
of change in cash when firms are classified as being financially constrained. Taking the first 
criterion (the payout ratio) as an example, a one dollar increase in cash is valued by shareholders 
at $2.355 ($1.419) when the firm is financially constrained (unconstrained). This is because cash, 
as an important source of internal capital, is critical to support identified investment 
opportunities when external funds are costly or impossible to obtain (Myers and Majluf 1984; 
Fazzari et al. 1988; Almeida et al. 2004; Faulkender and Wang 2006; Denis and Sibilkov 2010). 
I find evidence that, whether firms are financially constrained or not, the value of cash is higher 
if the cash is managed by more able CEOs. When firms are financially constrained, cash is in 
urgent need so that value-increasing investment opportunities will not be bypassed. The 
significant and positive impact of managerial ability on the value of cash (i.e., the positive and 
significant coefficient of the interaction between managerial ability score when using the annual 
payout ratio as the criterion) indicates that shareholders believe that more able CEOs are better at 
making use of the needed cash. When firms are financially unconstrained, more able CEOs also 
create more value out of the free cash that is not in urgent need, as indicated by the consistently 
positive coefficients of the interaction terms when using the debt rating and short-term paper 
rating as criteria. 
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Overall, the results in this set of analyses support the hypothesis that the value of cash is 
higher for the firms that hire more able CEOs, as evidenced by the positive and significant 
incremental effect of managerial ability on the value of cash. A further investigation of this 
association in the financially constrained and financially unconstrained contexts suggests that 
regardless of the availability of cash and the accessibility to external funds, the value of cash is 
higher if the cash is managed by higher ability CEOs.
19
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 I also conduct all the analyses using only continuous samples by excluding the firm-year observations with CEO 
turnover. The untabulated results for the M&A analyses are generally consistent except that there is a negative and 
siginificant association between managerial ability and change in ROA. The untabulated results for the capital 
investment analyses are weaker, especially for using abnormal investments. Especially, the results on the capital 
expenditures are opposite-higher ability tend to decrease capital expenditures as firms are more likely to over-invest. 
The untabulated results for the value of cash analysis are consistent.   
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Table 13: The Association between Managerial Ability and the Value of Cash in Financially Constrained and Unconstrained Firms 
 
 
Panel A: Using managerial ability score 
        
 
Payout Ratio 
 
Firm Size 
 
Debt Rating 
 
Paper Rating 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
 
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
∆C  2.355*** 1.419*** 
 
2.255*** 2.057*** 
 
2.292*** 2.033*** 
 
2.234*** 2.016*** 
 
(16.86) (6.71) 
 
(16.28) (5.31) 
 
(14.66) (15.23) 
 
(17.06) (11.15) 
ABILITY_SCORE 0.328*** 0.064**  0.417*** -0.000  0.185*** 0.226***  0.222*** 0.190*** 
 (6.05) (2.38)  (9.28) (-0.00)  (3.80) (4.66)  (4.37) (4.56) 
∆C_ABILITY 0.830*** 0.816  0.733 0.293  0.370 0.721***  0.342 0.956*** 
 (3.03) (1.06)  (1.63) (0.67)  (1.02) (2.73)  (0.96) (3.63) 
∆E 0.452*** 0.713*** 
 
0.463*** 0.500*** 
 
0.459*** 0.566*** 
 
0.477*** 0.567*** 
 
(9.66) (8.59) 
 
(9.56) (10.59) 
 
(12.11) (8.28) 
 
(11.60) (6.82) 
∆NA  0.189*** 0.170*** 
 
0.236*** 0.121*** 
 
0.217*** 0.152*** 
 
0.186*** 0.217*** 
 
(7.07) (5.77) 
 
(7.83) (4.18) 
 
(7.80) (4.93) 
 
(7.47) (4.11) 
∆RD  0.457 0.248 
 
0.641** -0.224 
 
0.370 0.694 
 
0.586* 0.404 
 
(1.40) (0.33) 
 
(2.11) (-0.48) 
 
(1.06) (1.63) 
 
(1.85) (0.90) 
∆I  -1.563*** -3.235*** 
 
-1.711*** -1.446** 
 
-1.753*** -1.910*** 
 
-1.558*** -3.324*** 
 
(-5.38) (-4.99) 
 
(-4.04) (-2.49) 
 
(-5.85) (-4.33) 
 
(-4.89) (-6.70) 
∆D -0.402 3.330*** 
 
3.694*** 0.643 
 
1.598** 1.865** 
 
1.126 2.699*** 
 
(-0.40) (6.38) 
 
(4.09) (0.73) 
 
(2.08) (2.16) 
 
(1.17) (4.60) 
C 0.526*** 0.330*** 
 
0.572*** 0.371*** 
 
0.532*** 0.398*** 
 
0.543*** 0.357*** 
 
(5.37) (4.30) 
 
(5.43) (5.23) 
 
(6.02) (4.76) 
 
(5.62) (5.08) 
L -0.544*** -0.325*** 
 
-0.545*** -0.505*** 
 
-0.650*** -0.326*** 
 
-0.595*** -0.277*** 
 
(-6.68) (-6.36) 
 
(-7.63) (-6.10) 
 
(-8.21) (-5.35) 
 
(-7.95) (-3.79) 
NF 0.054 -0.061 
 
0.113* -0.001 
 
0.021 0.019 
 
-0.006 0.172 
 
(1.22) (-1.28) 
 
(1.65) (-0.03) 
 
(0.46) (0.28) 
 
(-0.15) (1.54) 
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∆C_C -1.115*** -0.661*** 
 
-1.084*** -0.673*** 
 
-0.968*** -1.013*** 
 
-0.979*** -1.011*** 
 
(-8.05) (-2.93) 
 
(-7.37) (-2.81) 
 
(-5.68) (-6.80) 
 
(-6.42) (-6.54) 
∆C_L -2.188*** -1.263*** 
 
-2.066*** -2.168*** 
 
-2.454*** -1.642*** 
 
-2.174*** -1.601*** 
 
(-9.82) (-2.70) 
 
(-6.30) (-3.10) 
 
(-8.94) (-6.96) 
 
(-10.24) (-4.83) 
INTERCEPT 0.016 -0.000 
 
-0.018 0.087*** 
 
0.058*** 0.002 
 
0.059*** -0.017 
 
(0.83) (-0.03) 
 
(-1.07) (4.55) 
 
(3.94) (0.14) 
 
(3.89) (-1.23) 
            N 30431 17493 
 
17511 17493 
 
32007 26237 
 
40738 17551 
R
2 
0.240 0.146 
 
0.228 0.188 
 
0.234 0.207 
 
0.232 0.197 
            Panel B: Using managerial ability ranking 
 
       
 
Payout Ratio 
 
Firm Size 
 
Debt Rating 
 
Paper Rating 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
 
Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
∆C  2.057*** 1.121***  2.055*** 1.812***  2.118*** 1.766***  2.052*** 1.721*** 
 (14.36) (4.90)  (14.76) (4.40)  (12.94) (11.78)  (17.38) (8.26) 
ABILITY_RANKING 0.171*** 0.047*** 
 
0.205*** -0.002 
 
0.102*** 0.120*** 
 
0.116*** 0.107*** 
 
(7.39) (2.96) 
 
(9.18) (-0.08) 
 
(4.20) (5.58) 
 
(4.68) (5.43) 
∆C_ABILITY 0.591*** 0.541** 
 
0.381** 0.458* 
 
0.341** 0.516*** 
 
0.359** 0.564*** 
 
(4.19) (2.04) 
 
(2.32) (1.68) 
 
(2.43) (3.07) 
 
(2.43) (3.88) 
CONTROL VARIABLES Included Included 
 
Included Included 
 
Included Included 
 
Included Included 
            N 30431 17493 
 
17511 17493 
 
32007 26237 
 
40738 17551 
R
2 
0.241 0.147 
 
0.228 0.189 
 
0.235 0.207 
 
0.233 0.197 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
t-statistics are presented in parenthesis below the coefficients and are corrected for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional and time-series correlation using a 
two-way cluster at the firm and year level. 
*, **, and *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
 
 The upper echelons theory in Hambrick and Mason (1984) theorizes that behavioral 
factors of managers have an influential impact on strategic decisions and organizational 
outcomes. Prior studies have documented that a significant part of the variation in firms’ 
investment practices are explained by the unobserved manager fixed effects (Bertrand and 
Schoar 2003), managers’ compensation levels are greatly affected by the manager-fixed effects 
(Graham et al. 2012), and higher ability CEOs improve financial reporting quality (Francis et al. 
2008; Demerjian et al. 2013). Relying on the managerial ability measure developed by 
Demerjian et al. (2012), this study extends this stream of research by examining the association 
of CEO managerial ability with M&A quality, capital investment efficiency, and the value of 
cash. A CEO’s managerial ability is reflected in his/her decisions and implementation on 
investment. With higher abilities to anticipate future changes in their firms’ underlying economy, 
identify favorable investment opportunities to support the internal and external growth of their 
firms, and launch accurate and sufficient evaluation work, I predict that more able CEOs are 
more likely to conduct high quality M&As and make more efficient capital investment decisions. 
Further, given that the value of cash largely depends on the ways that CEOs use it, its availability, 
and the cost of external financing (e.g., Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986; Fazzari et al. 1988; 
Pinkowitz and Williamson 2004), I propose that shareholders will value cash more if a CEO is 
more capable of creating greater value out of cash by making better use of it (i.e., by engaging in 
efficient and quality investment activities). 
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Using four proxies, such as the market reaction to M&A announcements, the post-
acquisition change in operating performance, the likelihood and magnitude of goodwill 
impairment in the post-acquisition period, and the probability of divestiture, to measure the 
quality of M&A decisions, I find that M&A conducted by higher ability CEOs are less likely to 
have goodwill impairment and divestitures in the post-acquisition periods. However, managerial 
ability score is shown to negatively relate to post-acquisition change in operating cash flow. In 
this sense, the prediction of the positive association between managerial ability and M&A quality 
is partially supported. With respect to capital investment efficiency, while investigating total 
capital investments, capital expenditures, R&D, and acquisition expenditures as proxies for 
investment, I find that when firms are most likely to under-invest, higher ability CEOs tend to 
increase the investment levels in R&D, acquisition expenditures, and total capital investments. 
On the other hand, when firms’ likelihood of over-investing increases, higher ability CEOs tend 
to reduce the investment in acquisition expenditures and total capital investments. I find a similar 
pattern when using the abnormal levels of capital investments. These results together provide 
evidence that higher ability CEOs can improve investment efficiency when firms have a 
tendency to under-invest and/or over-invest, helping alleviate the prevalent agency problem. 
Finally, the analyses of the association between managerial ability and the value of cash support 
the prediction that cash is valued more when it is managed by more able CEOs. Overall, the 
results of this research provide evidence that managerial ability influences investment decision-
making and the value of cash, in line with the notion that individual-level factors affect the 
investment practices and organization outcomes.  
Future research can explore the causal link between managerial ability and investment 
efficiency. For example, one can investigate whether the mitigating effect of managerial ability 
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on under-investment is due to higher ability CEOs’ better access to external funds. Finally, the 
risk preference of higher ability CEOs can also be an interesting research avenue to explore in 
the future.  
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions  
Variables Definitions 
Dependent Variables:  
3 days Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 
3-day, [-1,0,+1], cumulative abnormal return over M&A 
announcements. The abnormal return is measured 
through the market model; 
Change in return on assets 
(CHG_ROA) 
 
The average ROA over the years t+1 to t+3 minus the 
average ROA over the years t-3 to t-1, where year t is the 
acquisition year. ROA is the returns on assets, measured 
as income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets; 
Change in CFO (CHG_CF) 
 
The average CFO over the years t+1 to t+3 minus the 
average CFO over the years t-3 to t-1, where year t is the 
acquisition year. CFO is operating cash flow, measured 
as cash flow from operations divided by total assets; 
The Likelihood of Goodwill Impairment 
(GOODWILL_DUM) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 (0) if a firm records (does 
not record) goodwill impairment losses in the three-year 
period following an acquisition that generates a large 
increase in goodwill. A large increase in goodwill is 
defined as an increase in goodwill greater or equal to 5% 
of total assets; 
The Magnitude of Goodwill Impairment 
(GOODWILL) 
The magnitude of goodwill impairment losses recorded 
in the 3-year period following an acquisition that 
generates a large increase in goodwill. A large increase 
in goodwill is defined as an increase in goodwill greater 
or equal to 5% of total assets; 
The Possibility of Divestiture 
( DIVESTITURE) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 (0) if an acquisition has 
(does not have) a subsequent divestiture during the 5 
years following the acquisition. An acquisition is defined 
as having a following divestiture if the target acquired at 
the acquisition date has the same 4-digit SIC code as the 
firm divested during the 5-year post-acquisition period; 
Total Capital Investment 
 (INVT_TOT) 
INVT=, the level of total capital investment, measured as 
the capital expenditure + research and development 
expenditure + acquisition expenditure - cash receipts 
from sale of property, plant, and equipment 
Capital Expenditure  The level of capital expenditure; 
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(CAPX) 
Research and Development Expenditure 
(R&D) 
The level of R&D expenditure; 
Acquisition Expenditure 
(ACQ) 
The level of acquisition expenditure; 
Abnormal Total Capital Investment 
(AB_TOT) 
The abnormal level of total capital investment, proxied 
by the residuals from the regression of a firm’s total 
capital investment on lagged sales growth; 
Abnormal Capital Expenditure 
(AB_CAPX) 
The abnormal level of capital expenditure, proxied by 
the residuals from the regression of a firm’s capital 
expenditure on lagged sales growth; 
Abnormal Research and Development 
Expenditure 
(AB_R&D) 
The abnormal level of  R&D expenditure, proxied by the 
residuals from the regression of a firm’s R&D 
expenditure on lagged sales growth; 
Abnormal Acquisition Expenditure 
(AB_ACQ) 
The abnormal level of acquisition expenditure, proxied 
by the residuals from the regression of a firm’s 
acquisition expenditure on lagged sales growth; 
Excess Stock Return 
(EX_RET) 
A stock’s excess return over the fiscal year - stock i’s 
return during fiscal year t (computed using monthly 
returns from CRSP) less the return of stock i’s size and 
book-to-market matched portfolio during fiscal year t 
constructed through the method in Fama and French 
(1993); 
Variables of Interest:  
ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 3-year average managerial ability scores before a M&A; 
            ABILITY_SCORE_AVG 3-year average managerial ability rankings before a 
M&A; 
ABILITY_SCORE 
 
CEO managerial ability scores, continuous data; 
ABILITY_RANKING 
 
CEO managerial ability rankings, non-negative values. 
Control Variables:  
Firm Size (SIZE) Natural log of total assets; 
Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) Market value of equity plus book value of debts scaled 
by total assets; 
Sales Growth (GROWTH) Percentage change in sales in the fiscal year; 
Returns on Assets (ROA) 
 
Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations, scaled by lagged total assets; 
Free cash flow (FCF) Operating income before depreciation – interest 
expenses – income taxes – capital expenditures, deflated 
by lagged total assets; 
Leverage (LEVERAGE) The ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
Pre-acquisition stock return    
(PRE_RET) 
Stock return over the period (-13,-1) month relative to 
the acquisition announcement; 
Cash Payment (Cash_DEAL) A dummy variable equal to 1 for purely cash-financed 
deals, and 0 otherwise; 
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Stock Payment (STOCK_DEAL) 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for purely stock-financed 
deals, and 0 otherwise; 
Public status of acquired firms 
(PUBLIC) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is public 
traded, and 0 otherwise; 
Diversifying Target (DIVERSIFYING) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target and the 
acquirer have different 2-digit SIC code, and 0 
otherwise; 
Country of acquired firms (DOMESTIC) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target is not a U.S. 
company, and 0 otherwise; 
Relative deal size (RELATIVE_SIZE) The ratio of the deal value to the acquirer’s market 
value; 
Number of bidders (BIDDERS) A dummy variable equal to 1 if there is more than one 
bidder for the target firm, and 0 otherwise; 
Diversifying M&A 
(DIVERSIFYING) 
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target and acquirer 
have different 2-digit SIC codes, and 0 otherwise; 
E- Index (E_INDEX) management entrenchment index, constructed according 
to Bebchuk et al. (2009), with higher index levels 
indicating stronger management entrenchment; 
CEO/Chairman duality 
(CEO_CHAIR) 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair 
of the board, and 0 otherwise; 
Equity-based Compensation Portion 
(EQUITY_COMP) 
The percentage of equity compensation to total 
compensation, where equity compensation is a sum of 
options and stocks; 
OVERI A composite score measure created to indicate the 
likelihood of over-investment and under-investment 
based on the ranking of cash and leverage levels; 
Market to Book ratio (MTOB) The ratio of the market value of total assets to book 
value of total assets; 
LOSS A dummy variable equal to 1 if net income before 
extraordinary items is negative, and 0 otherwise; 
 Sales Volatility (SALE_VOL) Standard deviation of the sales deflated by average total 
assets over previous 5 years; 
Investment Volatility (INVT_VOL) Standard deviation of investment over previous 5 years; 
CFO_SALE Operating cash flows divided by sales; 
Operating Cash Flow Volatility 
(CFO_VOL) 
Standard deviation of the cash flow from operations 
deflated by average total assets over previous 5 years; 
SLACK The ratio of cash to PPE;  
Dividend (DIV) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividends, 
and 0 otherwise; 
Bankruptcy Risk 
(ZSCORE) 
0.033*earnings before extraordinary item/total assets + 
sales/total assets + 0.014*retained earnings/total assets + 
0.012*(working capital/total assets) + 0.006*(market 
value of common stock/total liabilities); 
TANGIBILITY PPE divided by total assets; 
Capital Structure 
(KSTRUCTURE) 
long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and 
the market value of equity;   
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Industry Capital Structure 
(IND_STRUCTURE) 
mean K-structure for firms in the same SIC3-digit 
industry; 
∆C Change in cash and marketable securities; 
∆E Change in earnings before extraordinary items;  
∆NA Change in total assets excluding cash; 
∆RD Change in R&D Expenses (0 if missing); 
∆ I Change in interest expenses; 
∆ D Change in common dividends distributed to common 
stock; 
C Cash and marketable securities; 
L Total debt divided by the sum of the book value of total 
debt and the market value of equity; 
NF New finance in year t, including net new equity issues 
and net new debt issues; 
M Market value of equity. 
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